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WELCOME 
DEAN TREANOR: Good morning, everyone.  My name is Bill 
Treanor.  I’m the Dean of Fordham Law School.  I’m delighted to 
welcome you to today’s Symposium on “The Regulation of Investment 
Funds,” which is sponsored by the Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law. 
We are very proud to be able to host this really extraordinarily 
distinguished panel of experts on investment management funds.  It’s an 
important and timely topic, when considered in the context of the current 
political-economic climate and the continuing debate over the role the 
government should play in the private financial sector. 
This is the third Symposium that has been hosted by our student-
edited Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, and I’d like to 
thank the editors and staff of the Journal for all their hard work in 
putting this event together.  I’d like to especially recognize Audra 
White, a 3L, who is in the first row, who is the Symposium Editor of the 
Journal, and who conceived of this program and worked tirelessly to 
make this day so successful.  Audra. 
[Applause] 
The opportunity for students to plan and execute a program of this 
magnitude is a crucial component in the excellent legal education 
experiences that Fordham Law offers to students. 
It’s especially gratifying for the Law School to have adjunct faculty 
who represent the best of New York’s practicing bar and for them to 
take time out of their busy schedules, not only to teach our students 
about the most pressing issues that they themselves are confronting, but 
to participate in our programs.  We are fortunate today to have, to my 
left, James Jalil, a partner at Thompson Hine, as our Symposium 
Moderator. 
[Applause] 
I just have to say I read all the teaching evaluations, and it’s always 
humbling for me to read Professor Jalil’s teaching evaluations, they’re 
so good. 
Fordham Law School is a school that takes business law very 
seriously.  One of the ways in which we show our commitment to 
business law is through our Corporate Law Center, which I think is 
really the finest corporate law center in the country — with apologies 
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perhaps to Mr. West — and our corporate law Journal. 
The Journal is one of the five most cited corporate law journals in 
the country.  It has extraordinary influence.  It was cited by the Supreme 
Court in 2005 in the Arthur Andersen case. 
The Fordham Corporate Law Center was founded in 2001 to serve 
as a focal point for excellence and innovation in current and emerging 
issues in business law and in business. 
I’d like to particularly recognize the Executive Director of our 
Corporate Law Center, who just does a fabulous job and who worked to 
help put together this Symposium, Ann Rakoff, who’s in the back. 
[Applause] 
Now, in 2009 alone the Corporate Law Center has brought to the 
Law School such distinguished speakers as William Dudley, the 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and SEC 
Commissioner Elisse Walter. 
Next month the Center is hosting three exciting programs.  You can 
find more details about them on our website.  But I just want to call your 
attention to the very first one, which will be on March 8th, which is our 
DeStefano Lecture, which will be on “Corporate Accountability, 
Governance, and Compensation Issues,” which will have as the 
Moderator Judge Sporkin and participants Todd Lang, Gary Naftalis, 
and Jeffrey Sonnenfeld. 
When I teach, I always say there’s one or two take-away points that 
I want to convey to the class.  So my take-away points here are (1) 
Fordham Law is very serious about business law — I want that to sink 
in; it will be on the pop quiz later; and (2) this is going to be a fabulous, 
fabulous Symposium about an incredibly timely topic, and we’re 
privileged to be able to host it. 
Without any further ado, I think I’m turning matters over to Audra. 
[Applause] 
 
AUDRA WHITE: Good morning, everyone. 
I’d like to thank all of you for coming here today.  I’m very excited 
to host this Symposium.  It was a long time in coming. 
I want to thank the Dean for his very kind words and for hosting us 
here at the Law School today. 
I also want to thank everyone in the audience who’s a distinguished 
member of our practicing alumni community.  I know we have a lot of 
alumni here today also. 
Most of all, I’d really like to thank Ann Rakoff, whom the Dean 
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also mentioned, the Executive Director of our Corporate Law Center.  
She has been just instrumental in helping me with everything that went 
into this event.  And also Zachary Slates, who has been there the entire 
time with everything that I needed.  Both of them have really been a 
tremendous asset in making this possible today. 
The Law School is also honored to have my professor, James Jalil, 
a partner at Thompson Hine, as our Moderator today.  He’s an adjunct 
professor of Securities Regulation here at Fordham.  Mr. Jalil is a 
member of Thompson Hine’s Executive Committee and is also a 
member of the Investment Management subgroup at Thompson Hine.  
Today he brings over 30 years of experience representing hedge funds, 
investment managers, and registered investment advisers.  We’re very 
grateful to have his wisdom on the panel today. 
So thank you again and without further ado, I will go ahead and 
turn it over to Mr. Jalil. 
 
 
PANEL DISCUSSION 
JAMES JALIL: Thank you, Audra. 
Thank you and welcome.  We have an unbelievable panel today, 
and I’m personally looking forward to the discussion. 
What we’re going to do is I’ll introduce the panelists and then 
we’re going to have a discussion.  Each panelist will make brief 
remarks, then we’ll have a discussion.  After the break, we’re going to 
continue the discussion, and then we’ll take questions from the audience. 
Introducing this panel is a privilege. 
 
To my left, Andrew “Buddy” Donohue is the Director of the 
Division of Investment Management of the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  For those of you who may not know, that’s a 
very big deal.  We’re honored to have him here today.  He was sworn in 
by Chairman Christopher Cox in May 2006.  He is one of the most 
senior financial services regulators in the United States, with principal 
oversight for the over-$40-trillion investment management industry.  As 
Director, Mr. Donohue is responsible for developing regulatory policy 
and administering the federal securities laws applicable to mutual funds, 
ETFs, closed-end funds, variable insurance products, UITs, and 
investment advisers. 
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What I personally admire about Buddy Donohue is he comes to the 
Commission with an industry background.  Prior to becoming 
Investment Management Director, Mr. Donohue was Global General 
Counsel for Merrill Lynch Investment Managers.  In that position, he 
oversaw the firm’s legal and regulatory compliance functions for over 
$500 billion in assets including mutual funds, fixed income funds, hedge 
funds, private equities, managed futures, and exchange funds. 
Prior to Merrill Lynch, he spent more than a decade as Executive 
Vice President, General Counsel, Director, and member of the Executive 
Committee for OppenheimerFunds.  He brings over 30 years’ experience 
in the financial services industry to the Commission. 
He is a graduate of New York University School of Law and 
graduated with honors from Hofstra University in 1972.  He has three 
children and three grandchildren.   
Welcome, Buddy. 
 
To his left, we’re really privileged to have one of the giants in the 
legal industry.  Paul Roth is a founding partner of Schulte Roth & Zabel, 
a member of the firm’s Executive Committee, and Chair of the firm’s 
Investment Management Group.  Paul’s more than forty years of 
experience in the private investment funds area includes representation 
of hedge funds, private equity funds, offshore funds, investment advisers 
and broker-dealers in connection with fund formations and compliance, 
securities regulation, and mergers and acquisitions.  He does it all.  He’s 
truly a giant in the industry, a household name to the bar, and we are 
privileged and honored to have him here today. 
Paul is on the Advisory Board of Harvard Law School’s Center on 
Lawyers and the Professional Services Industry, and a member of 
Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences’ Task Force on the 
Undergraduate Experience.  He is a past president and member of the 
board of Harvard Law School Alumni Association, and also is on the 
Citizens Committee for New York City and the NAACP Legal Defense 
and Educational Fund. 
He is quoted extensively in the media in connection with hedge 
fund and investment manager matters.  He’s a magna cum laude 
graduate from Harvard College in 1951 and a cum laude graduate of 
Harvard Law School.  He was awarded a Fulbright Fellowship to study 
abroad.  So we’re honored to have Paul Roth here. 
 
To his left, it is a personal privilege to introduce Matthew Siano.  
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Matthew Siano is Managing Director and General Counsel of Two 
Sigma Investments, a global investment manager specializing in 
quantitative arbitrage investing across a broad range of asset classes.  
Two Sigma currently manages numerous hedge fund and private 
investment pools with over $3 billion in third-party assets under 
management.  As Two Sigma’s General Counsel, Mr. Siano is 
responsible for the firm’s legal, regulatory and compliance matters and 
is head of its legal and compliance departments.  Prior to joining Two 
Sigma, Mr. Siano was an associate at the firm of Seward & Kissel, 
where he specialized in investment management matters. 
Mr. Siano graduated cum laude from the College of William and 
Mary and is a graduate of Fordham Law School. 
I bring this as a personal privilege because Matt was a student of 
mine, and for any teacher there’s no greater joy than to see a student 
blossom and succeed as Matt has done.  So it’s a privilege to welcome 
Matt back to Fordham — no longer as a student, but as a colleague.  
Thank you. 
 
As an adjunct professor, I sometimes am given the honorific 
“Professor Jalil,” which I do not merit.  Our next panelist merits that 
title.  Professor Verret is a rising star as a legal scholar in the securities, 
corporate, and investment management areas. 
He received his JD and MA in Public Policy from Harvard Law 
School and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.  While in law 
school, Professor Verret served as an Olin Fellow in Law and 
Economics at the Harvard Program on Corporate Governance under the 
guidance of Professor Lucian Bebchuk. 
Professor Verret has served as law clerk for Vice-Chancellor John 
Noble of the Delaware Court of Chancery.  Prior to joining the faculty at 
Mason Law School, Professor Verret was an associate in the SEC 
Enforcement Defense Practice Group at Skadden, Arps. 
He has written extensively on corporate law topics, including a 
recent paper, “Delaware’s Guidance,” co-written with Chief Justice 
Myron T. Steele of the Delaware Supreme Court.  His academic work 
has been featured in the Yale Journal on Regulation, The Business 
Lawyer, the Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law, and the Virginia Law and 
Business Review.  Professor Verret was recently selected by the 
Northwestern Law School Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and 
Economic Growth for a 2009-2010 Searle-Kaufmann Research 
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Fellowship. 
Professor Verret also has been active in testifying before Congress, 
particularly in 2009 on the Obama Administration’s financial regulatory 
reform proposals.  He is a frequent guest in the media in discussing 
corporate and regulatory matters.  So we’re honored and pleased to have 
a real professor here today. 
 
Finally, but not least, is my friend Holland West.  Holland West is 
Of Counsel to the law firm of Shearman & Sterling, with more than 30 
years of experience on Wall Street in financial and legal matters. 
Previously, Mr. West was a partner at Shearman & Sterling and 
head of its global hedge fund, private equity, derivatives, and structured 
finance practices; as well as a partner at Cadwalader, Wickersham & 
Taft as head of its asset management and derivatives practices; and 
Assistant General Counsel at Goldman Sachs advising on capital 
markets, derivatives, and commodity businesses. 
Mr. West is experienced in diverse investment management matters 
and has represented an international clientele for over 30 years.  He is 
one of the flowers of the bar and brings his experience and his wisdom 
to us today.  So thank you very much, Holland, for being here with us. 
With that, I’d like to begin with Buddy Donohue to make some 
remarks on where we are today, where Congress is going, more 
importantly where the SEC is going, and where the industry is going. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: Thank you, and thank you for inviting me 
to speak at the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law’s Third 
Annual Symposium on the Regulation of Investment Funds. 
I look forward to a spirited discussion of the current regulatory 
proposals affecting hedge funds and other private funds. 
I remind you that my views I express today are my own and not 
necessarily those of the Commission, the individual Commissioners, or 
my colleagues on the Commission staff. 
Today I would like to discuss the regulation of private funds 
through their advisers and the persons selling private funds to investors.  
You will see that there are gaps in the regulation currently.  I will also 
briefly cover international cooperation in the regulation of private fund 
managers. 
The U.S. securities laws have not kept pace with the growth in 
market significance of hedge funds and other private funds, and as a 
result, the Commission has very limited oversight authority over these 
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vehicles.  Sponsors of private funds, typically investment advisers, are 
able to organize their affairs in such a way as to avoid registration under 
the federal securities laws.  The Commission only has authority to 
conduct compliance examinations of those funds and advisers that are 
registered under one of the statutes the Commission administers. 
Consequently, advisers to private funds can opt out of Commission 
oversight.  This presents a significant regulatory gap in need of closing. 
The Commission tried to close the gap in 2004, at least partially, by 
adopting a rule requiring all hedge fund advisers to register under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.  That rulemaking was overturned by 
an appellate court in the Goldstein†
Legislative action is needed at this time to enhance regulation in 
this area.  Advisers Act registration, coupled with existing law 
regulating persons selling funds, would, I believe, provide the 
Commission with needed tools to provide oversight of this important 
industry in order to protect investors and the securities markets, without 
impeding investment strategies of the funds. 
 decision in 2006. 
Today I wish to discuss how registration of advisers to private 
funds under the Advisers Act would greatly enhance the Commission’s 
ability to properly oversee the activities of private funds and their 
advisers. 
I would also like to discuss the regulation of the people selling 
private funds, because this is an important element for ensuring that only 
the appropriate types of investors participate in these funds. 
Although hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital 
funds reflect different approaches to investing, legally they are 
indistinguishable.  They are all pools of investment capital organized to 
take advantage of various exemptions from registration. 
Other than the Qualified Purchaser Exemption, all of these 
exemptions were designed to achieve some purpose other than 
permitting private funds and their advisers to avoid registration. 
Private funds typically avoid registration of their securities under 
the Securities Act of 1933 by conducting private placements under 
Section 4(2) and Regulation D.  As a consequence, these funds are sold 
primarily to accredited investors.  The investors typically receive a 
private placement memorandum, rather than a statutory prospectus, and 
the funds do not file periodic reports with the Commission.  In other 
words, they lack the same degree of transparency required of publicly 
 
1 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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offered issuers, on the theory that investors can fend for themselves. 
Private funds seek to qualify for one of two exemptions from the 
regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940: Either limit 
themselves to 100 total investors, as provided in Section 3(c)(1); or 
permit only qualified purchasers to invest, as provided in Section 
3(c)(7). 
As a result, the traditional safeguards designed to protect investors 
in the Investment Company Act are the subject of contractual 
arrangements in private funds.  These safeguards include investor 
redemption rights, application of auditing standards, asset valuation, 
portfolio transparency, and fund governance.  They are typically 
included in private fund partnership documents, but are not required, and 
vary significantly among funds. 
The investment activities of private funds are directed by an 
investment adviser, which is typically the fund’s general partner.  
Investment advisers to private funds often claim an exemption in the 
registration under Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act, which is 
available to an adviser that has fewer than fifteen clients and does not 
hold itself out generally to the public as an investment adviser. 
Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act contains a de minimis 
provision that I believe originally was designed to cover advisers that 
were too small to warrant federal attention.  The exemption now covers 
advisers with billions of dollars under management, because each 
adviser is permitted to count a single fund as a client.  Interestingly, this 
exemption predates the rise of hedge, private equity, and venture capital 
funds. 
The Commission recognized the incongruity of the purpose of the 
exemption with the Accounting Rule, and adopted a new Rule in 2004 
that required hedge fund advisers to look through the funds to count the 
number of investors in the funds as clients for purposes of determining 
whether or not the adviser met the de minimis exemption.  This was the 
Rule that was overturned by the appellate court in the Goldstein 
decision. 
All advisers to private funds, whether registered or not, must 
comply with the antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act, 
including an antifraud rule the Commission adopted in response to the 
Goldstein decision that prohibits advisers from defrauding investors in 
pooled investment vehicles.  Registered advisers, however, are also 
subject to additional requirements as described below. 
Ensuring that only appropriate sophisticated persons invest in 
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private funds is fundamental to their unregistered status.  Beyond the 
formal Investor Qualification Test embedded in funds’ exemptions, 
broker-dealer regulation of intermediaries provides important 
protections to investors. 
Under the Securities Act of 1934, “any person engaged in the 
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others” 
must generally register as a broker-dealer.  As with advisers, registration 
of broker-dealers provides important investor protections. 
Among other things, registered broker-dealers are subject to SRO 
regulation, suitability requirements, or the sales practices regulations.  
Although there are exceptions to the registration requirement, they are 
narrowly drawn, and as a practical matter the lawful receipt of 
compensation in connection with the purchase and sale of securities 
typically requires registration as or association with a registered broker-
dealer. 
I am concerned that some participants in the private fund industry 
may be inappropriately claiming to rely on exemptions or interpretative 
guidance to avoid broker-dealer registration.  In so doing, these 
participants may be creating a de facto gap in broker-dealer regulation, 
in addition to the legislative gap in the Commission’s authority with 
respect to adviser regulation.  Persons who are not currently registered 
as or associated with a broker-dealer should carefully consider whether 
they should be. 
Legislative proposals under consideration would address the 
legislative gap in adviser registration by eliminating the Section 
203(b)(3) de minimis exemption from the Advisers Act.  Investment 
adviser registration would be beneficial to investors and our markets in 
several important ways. 
Registration of private fund advisers would provide the 
Commission with the ability to collect data from the advisers about their 
business operations and the private funds that they manage.  The 
Commission would thereby, for the first time, have accurate, reliable, 
and complete information about the sizable and important private fund 
industry, which could be used to better protect investors and market 
integrity.  Significantly, the information collected could include 
systemic risk data, which could then be shared with other regulators. 
Advisers are fiduciaries to their clients.  Advisers’ fiduciary duties 
are enforceable under the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act.  
They require, among other things, that advisers avoid conflicts of 
interest with their clients or fully disclose the conflicts to their clients. 
2011] THE REGULATION OF INVESTMENT FUNDS 11 
Registration under the Advisers Act gives the Commission 
authority to conduct on-site examinations of advisers designed, among 
other things, to identify conflicts of interest and determine whether the 
adviser has properly disclosed them. 
In the case of private funds, it gives a regulator an opportunity to 
determine facts that most investors in private funds cannot discern for 
themselves.  For example, investors often cannot determine whether 
fund assets are subject to appropriate safekeeping or whether the 
performance represented to them in an account statement is accurate.  In 
this way, registration may also have a deterrent effect, because it would 
increase an unscrupulous adviser’s risk of being discovered. 
Registration of private fund advisers under the Advisers Act would 
permit oversight of adviser trading activities to prevent market abuses, 
such as insider trading and market manipulation, including improper 
short selling. 
Private fund advisers registered with the Commission are required 
to develop internal compliance programs administrated by a chief 
compliance officer.  Chief compliance officers help advisers manage any 
conflict of interest the adviser has with or among its clients, including its 
private funds.  Examination staff resources are limited and cannot be at 
every office of every adviser at all times.  Compliance officers serve as 
the front-line watch for violations of securities laws and provide 
protection against conflicts of interest. 
Registration with the Commission permits us to screen individuals 
associated with the adviser and to deny registration if they have been 
convicted of a felony or engaged in securities fraud. 
In addition, many private fund advisers have small-to-medium-
sized businesses.  So it is important that any regulation take into account 
the resources available to those types of businesses.  Fortunately, the 
Advisers Act has long been used to regulate both small and large 
businesses, so the existing rules and regulations already account for 
those considerations.  In fact, roughly 69 percent of the investment 
advisers registered with the Commission have ten or fewer employees. 
Under current law, an investment adviser with fifteen or more 
clients and at least $30 million in assets under management must register 
with the Commission, while an adviser providing the same advisory 
services to the same individuals through a limited partnership could 
avoid registering with the Commission.  Investment adviser registration, 
in my view, is appropriate for any investment adviser, regardless of the 
form of its clients or the types of securities in which they invest. 
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While the legislation being discussed does close some gaps in 
regulation, in my opinion some of the provisions would, unfortunately, 
create new gaps.  The various bills provide exemptions for advisers to 
private equity and venture capital funds, as well as private fund advisers 
with less than $150 million in assets under management.  Those 
provisions do contemplate that the advisers would be subject to record-
keeping and reporting requirements, which are important elements of 
adviser regulation.  However, as unregistered advisers, they would avoid 
other provisions that are vital to investor protections afforded by the 
Advisers Act.  For example, the Commission would not have the ability 
to keep convicted felons from associating with these advisers, and the 
advisers would not be subject to the Compliance Rule. 
The Commission’s 2004 rule-making was limited to hedge fund 
advisers.  However, since that time, the lines which may once have 
separated hedge funds from private equity and venture capital funds 
have blurred and distinctions are often unclear.  The same adviser often 
manages funds pursuing different strategies, and even individual private 
funds often defy precise categorization. 
Moreover, I am concerned that, in order to escape Commission 
oversight, advisers may alter fund investment strategies or investment 
terms in ways that will create market inefficiencies.  This happened 
following the Commission’s 2004 rule-making, when advisers 
lengthened the lock-up imposed on investors in order to avoid 
registration. 
In addition, Ponzi scheme operators are likely to gravitate to less-
regulated spaces in the investment management industry.  Those that 
have falsely claimed to be hedge funds until now could just as easily 
claim to be venture capital funds tomorrow, as they would have a much 
longer window before investors expected to see any cash. 
Europe is also looking at the regulation of hedge funds and other 
private funds through new European legislation in the form of the 
proposed Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive.  A new 
Directive was first proposed by the European Commission in spring of 
2009.  Various possible changes are being discussed by the European 
Council and the European Parliament. 
The main proposals that have been published in Europe so far 
resemble the U.S. legislative proposals in some respects.  For example, 
they focus on regulating the manager or adviser to the hedge fund or 
other private fund instead of regulating the fund directly.  Also, there is 
a debate about the scope of the Directive with respect to private equity 
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and venture capital funds. 
Not surprisingly, however, the European proposals differ in some 
ways from those in the United States.  For example, the European 
proposals require alternative fund managers to maintain specified levels 
of capital and have risk management programs. 
Another important distinction is how the U.S. and the EU regimes 
apply to advisers physically based outside of their territory.  The 
Advisers Act registration requirements generally apply to non-U.S. 
advisers if they have U.S. clients.  Under longstanding SEC staff 
interpretations, a non-U.S. SEC-registered adviser need only apply many 
Advisers Act requirements to its dealings with its U.S. clients.  Under 
this position, a non-U.S. private fund adviser without direct U.S. clients, 
such as a foreign adviser to offshore funds with U.S. investors, may treat 
the fund as its clients for purposes of the Advisers Act, simplifying its 
compliance.  Non-U.S. advisers wishing to manage money for U.S. 
persons may elect to subject themselves to these proportionate and 
tailored regulatory requirements, regardless of the requirements of the 
adviser’s home regulator. 
The application to non-EU managers, including U.S. managers, of 
the proposed EU Directive varies significantly among the published 
versions.  However, various proposals appear to require that the 
adviser’s home country regulator have a regulatory system that is 
deemed to be equivalent to Europe’s or contain specified elements from 
the European proposal in order for the adviser to manage assets raised 
from European investors. 
The proposals do not appear to contemplate that a non-EU manager 
could elect to register with an EU regulator.  In effect, these proposals 
may impose requirements on the adviser’s regulator instead of on the 
adviser itself.  As a result, these proposals seem likely to exclude some 
non-EU managers, including potentially U.S. advisers, even if those 
managers are willing to follow the European requirements. 
I believe countries should work together on a multilateral and 
cooperative basis to ensure consistently high standards.  For example, 
the Commission staff has been working with the U.K. FSA and IOSCO 
to develop a template for the collection of consistent and comparable 
data from hedge fund managers.  However, I do not believe this means 
that we must as regulators in all cases apply identical standards. 
The registration and oversight of private fund advisers without 
exemptions based on strategy would provide transparency and enhance 
Commission oversight of the capital markets.  It would give regulators, 
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for the first time, reliable and complete data about the impact of private 
funds on others and on our securities markets.  It would give the 
Commission access to information about the operation of hedge funds 
and other private funds through their advisers, and it would permit 
private funds, which play an important role in our capital markets, to 
retain the current flexibility in their investment strategies.  Coupled with 
the application of existing requirements to those persons selling private 
funds, adviser registration would help ensure investor protection. 
Internationally, all countries should achieve high-quality and 
similar outcomes in our regulatory and supervisory practices, but 
countries should not impose standards on one another if they are not 
identical. 
 
JAMES JALIL: Thank you.  There will be a lot of questions on 
that, I’m sure. 
Paul? 
 
HOLLAND WEST: Thank you, Jim. 
Excuse me one minute.  I have a little something I want to bring up 
here.  I’m going to be talking about proposed legislation.  There are two 
major bills. 
One has been passed by the House.  This is it.  It’s printed each on 
double sides, so it’s 1279 pages.  They say legislation is not easy to 
watch in the process.  It’s not easy to read either.  This is a 249-page 
sponsors’ amendment for technical corrections in this 1279-page volume 
here.  By the way, many of these came from my staff. 
Afterwards, I’m sure that Mr. Donohue would accept questions.  
All you have to do is refer to the page number and he’ll know what to 
do. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: This is entirely unfair, because I told Paul 
I was going to ask him about a particular page, and he just — he’s the 
master.  He just turned it around on me. 
 
PAUL ROTH: So I’m going to focus mostly in H.R. 473, (1) 
because I have it with me, (2) because it has been passed by the House 
of Representatives, and (3) in many respects in which it impacts 
investment advisers it’s not all that different than the proposed Dodd bill 
that we have before us — and I say “proposed Dodd bill” because 
nothing has been passed in the Senate, even by the committee that has it.  
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Today’s Wall Street Journal indicates that Senator Dodd and a 
Republican senator are going off to visit someplace and that they’re 
going to come back after this weekend and present a bill for the 
committee for next week.  So we’ll hope and see what happens. 
Now, the House bill is called The Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act.  The part that deals with hedge funds is called 
Title 5, The Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act.  That’s 
kind of small.  So why didn’t I bring the whole bill?  The reason is — 
we’ll go over some of the provisions — the meat as it affects private 
investment advisers is in Title 5, but there is an awful lot in the rest of 
the bill, just scattered throughout, that also affects the way private 
investment advisers will be regulated in the future. 
There are some basic policy issues that are faced by this kind of 
legislation, some of which Buddy has already indicated. 
The first question is: Registration of advisers to hedge funds, should 
it be all hedge funds?  Should it include other entities that take 
advantage of the exemptions and exceptions from the Investment 
Company Act, such as venture capital funds and private equity funds, 
including all flavors of those funds, such as oil and gas funds, energy 
funds, and real estate funds?  We’ll talk about the policy reasons for 
doing that one way or the other a little bit later in the program. 
The second question is: How do you allocate the responsibility for 
investor protection between the states and the SEC?  At present, there 
are somewhat more than 11,000 registrants as investment advisers with 
the SEC.  That includes, if I recall correctly, something in the nature of 
1,700 hedge fund advisers.  So there will be more hedge fund advisers 
coming in.  As I go through the statute, we’ll see that there will be 
smaller advisers who presumably will be registered by a state. 
A third question is: What should be the way in which these hedge 
fund managers or private investment fund managers, if it includes both 
private equity, venture capital, and other types of funds that are 
organized through this exemption from the Investment Company Act — 
how should they be systemically evaluated?  What kind of information 
should be obtained from them for systemic risk purposes?  I don’t think 
anybody is arguing that no one should be forced to give information 
relating to systemic risk.  The question becomes: How do you avoid the 
SEC becoming a document dump for information that isn’t usable, and 
how will it be used, and who will they give it to, and who’s going to be 
able to analyze it? 
Should those small number of hedge funds — and I’ll get to this in 
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a little while — who are systemically relevant be subject to the same 
kinds of requirements that depositary institutions are subject to under the 
Bank Holding Company Act because they are systemically relevant? 
Now, broadly speaking, what the legislation does is it does away 
with the private advisory exemption and focuses on if you advise people 
with a certain amount of assets under management, you are required to 
register.  I think there is, at least among people that I represent in the 
hedge fund community and the Managed Funds Association, which is, 
I’d say, the representative of the hedge fund industry in Washington, 
general agreement that registration, done intelligently, is the correct 
thing to do at this stage. 
Hedge funds are no longer a cottage industry.  There’s over $2 
trillion of assets in the hedge fund industry.  While that may sound small 
compared to the $40 trillion that Buddy regulates, for those of us who 
work in the industry, we think that’s a lot of money. 
Up till now, broadly speaking, the Advisers Act has focused, I 
would say, entirely on investor protection.  What the amendments do is 
include systemic risk issues to the Advisers Act. 
Now, let’s just talk about what happens. 
Under the House bill, it provides that there will be an exemption 
available for registration for fund managers who advise only private 
funds — and a private fund is defined as something which takes 
advantage of the exception from registration under the Investment 
Company Act pursuant to 3(c)(7) or 3(c)(1) of that Act — if they 
manage less than $150 million in assets.  But there is a provision that 
says “the Commission shall take into account the size, governance, and 
investment strategy of the funds advised by such managers and, if it 
determines that they pose a systemic risk, it could subject them to 
regulation which is appropriate for the systemic risk posed.”  I would 
say that provision is likely to be definitionally nonoperative, because if 
you have less than $150 million under management, systemic risk is not 
likely to be the issue that they are related to.  Investor protection for 
investors in the funds for managers who manage less than $150 million 
is apparently left entirely to the states. 
Now, there are some complicated things that go on in this bill, 
because the bill seems to leave the threshold for registration with the 
SEC mandatory at $30 million and optional at $25 million.  On the other 
hand, it creates a concept called “mid-sized investment advisers,” and 
mid-sized investment advisers are those who manage between $25 
million and $100 million.  The SEC can expand those numbers, but 
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that’s the little universe of mid-sized investment advisers. 
As I read it, it says that those mid-sized investment advisers must 
register with the state in which they maintain their principal office and 
place of business if that state has a registration provision and conducts 
examinations.  If it doesn’t have an examination regime, then they must 
register with the SEC. 
I think there’s a lot of room for what is the examination regime that 
the state creates, and there’s a lot of confusion that may exist as this 
concept of federalism takes place if it continues in these bills. 
Now, the Senate bill, or the Dodd proposal, simply raises the limit 
for registration, or the threshold for registration, with the SEC to $100 
million.  It says: “If you don’t manage at least $100 million, you are 
going to go to the states, that’s where you’re going to be registered” — 
in a sense saying, “You’re not systemically relevant,” something with 
which I agree, “and the states are capable of handling investor protection 
for your clients,” something which I wonder whether it’s actually true. 
I will tell you that, as a lawyer who is representing people who are 
starting funds, the concept of having to deal with the laws of the various 
states — on the one hand, I think, “Well, that’s pretty good; that will 
give us the opportunity to hire more lawyers to figure out all these state 
things”; on the other hand, I think, “Oh my God, how are we going to 
advise people with respect to all of these different states?” 
Now, the House bill says: “If you’re subject to regulation by more 
than five states, you can come back and register with the SEC.”  So I’m 
thinking we’re going to have to get clients and tell them, “You’ve got to 
be subject to registration by more than five states so we can go to the 
SEC, because at least we know what the SEC wants.  When you get to 
the states, do we really know what they want?  Not sure.” 
Only one state’s books and records requirement can be imposed 
upon any particular adviser, and that’s the state where you have your 
principal place of business.  But, if you go through the Act, and if 
you’ve ever had a client who has gone through an examination by OSI, 
you know there is a lot more than books and records that is required with 
respect to regulation, and the idea of having to deal with that in the 
various fifty states if you’ve got up to $100 million in assets under 
management is, frankly, intimidating.  And I don’t get scared easily. 
So that’s one of the big questions. 
A second big question that’s raised by the legislation — and Buddy 
talked about it, and he put it in his exquisite language: he said that the 
way in which the SEC deals with registration of offshore advisers is 
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“proportional and tailored.”  I’m surprised he didn’t say “exquisite” as 
well. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: I left that for you. 
 
PAUL ROTH: Okay. 
But one of the real questions that you have, and it’s a policy 
question — both the House bill that has been passed and the Senate bill 
that is proposed talk about something called “foreign private investment 
advisers.”  As far as I can tell, they are pretty much irrelevant in terms of 
the concept, because they don’t give relief to anybody who is a foreign 
adviser to hedge funds or to private equity or venture capital, should 
they be required to register. 
Now, there are good public policy issues that really should be 
addressed with respect to this. 
One is: You’re managing money and you’re a U.S. manager and 
you’re registered with the SEC and you’ve got somebody who is in an 
emerging market and you’ve got a global investment program and you 
want this manager in the emerging market to manage, let’s say, a couple 
hundred million because you’ve got billions of dollars in your fund.  
You go to the guy and you say, “We’ve done research on your record, 
you’re terrific, and we really would like to give you a couple hundred 
million to manage in the Indonesian market.”  You do this with the 
interpreter because he doesn’t speak English, but he’s really good in the 
Indonesian market. 
He says he’s very happy to do it.  You put down the requirements 
under which you will supervise him.  Then you say, “And by the way, 
because you’re a sub-adviser to us, you’re going to have to register with 
the SEC.” 
The interpreter says, “You’ve got to register with the SEC.” 
He says, “What’s that, and do they publish an Indonesian version of 
what the Investment Advisers Rules are?” 
In a nutshell, that captures the problem.  People who do not engage 
in business in the United States, should their talents as investment 
advisers be available to institutions who want global investment 
management exposure? 
An argument on the other hand is: You don’t have to take money 
from people who are residents of the United States.  If you do, it comes 
with the requirement that you provide some information regarding your 
operations to the SEC because what you do will have impact upon 
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people who are U.S. residents. 
It’s an interesting policy question, and I think that, hopefully, we 
will engage in conversation with the staff as to how to deal with this 
through rule-making if it’s not more intelligently addressed in the 
legislation. 
Now, the systemic risk issues are dealt with by requiring the SEC to 
collect information from the advisers regarding the funds that they 
advise.  It says that “the records of a private fund maintained or filed by 
its registered investment adviser shall be deemed to be the records and 
reports of the investment adviser.” 
Matt may talk about whether this is really a pitfall.  If you are not 
preparing the records but the records are being prepared by the fund that 
you advise, is that something that you should have responsibility 
regarding the truthfulness of when you file it or maintain those records? 
Each investment adviser to a fund is required for each fund to file 
with the SEC some things which are easy and some things which I don’t 
really understand. 
• One is assets under management.  That’s easy. 
• Second is the use of leverage.  That’s okay, it seems to me, if we 
understand what leverage is — and there are many, many different 
definitions of how you achieve leverage.  Every derivative has leverage 
in it.  If you buy an option to buy a security, that creates leverage in 
some people’s definition.  In other people’s definition, leverage is if you 
borrow money.  A third definition is what your exposure is with respect 
to a position. 
So one of the big things we’re going to have to go through here, 
which is part of rule-making generally, is: How do we create a set of 
common understandings of what people are going to be asked to file 
information about; or, if we can’t create a set of common 
understandings, how people articulate in their filings how they are 
calculating what it is that they say is their leverage, for example. 
Other things are: 
• Counterparty credit risk exposure, which is clearly relevant, I 
suspect, for systemic risk; 
• Trading and investment positions — that’s easy to figure out; 
• Trading practices — Buddy will tell us what we mean; and 
• “Such other information in consultation with the other federal 
systemic risk regulators as the Commission determines is appropriate.” 
And then, there is a series of optional information provisions in the 
statute, which the SEC is asked to determine what other information 
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shall be required. 
So we move into this whole new area that the Commission has not 
been in before, which is collecting information relevant to systemic risk. 
The provisions in the Act really do not change the amount of 
information dramatically that the SEC is asking for with respect to 
investor protection. 
There is one curious provision — I say “curious” because I wonder 
what it really means — and that is that “the Commission can require 
managers to provide reports and other documents to investors, 
prospective investors, counterparties, and creditors.”  It’s a pretty 
broadsided thing, and I’m not sure why it’s there because I’m not sure 
what the Commission can’t require under existing law.  But this is an 
affirmative statement, that the Commission has the opportunity to do 
this, rather than the Commission, for example, relying on the antifraud 
provisions to require it. 
“The Commission is also given the authority to classify people and 
functions based upon size, scope, business model, compensation 
scheme, and potential for creating systemic risk.”  This is an 
enhancement of a classification provision that exists under the current 
law, and I think, hopefully, will be one that makes a great deal of sense 
for Buddy’s Division to exercise through rule-making, because it seems 
to me that there is a rather good argument for requiring registration for, 
let’s say, anybody who is a private fund, but changing the reporting 
requirements to meet the needs of those private fund investors.  
Personally, I would much rather that this guy and his staff did it than 
that the people in Congress try to write these provisions. 
Now, what will be the impact of these changes? 
I don’t think registration is going to be a great burden, as Buddy 
agreed — 1,700 registered investment advisers already exist with respect 
to hedge funds. 
I think it’s really important to understand that the hedge fund 
industry is a heavily concentrated industry and that when we’re talking 
about systemic issues as it relates to hedge funds, while there may be 
7,000 or 8,000 hedge fund advisers globally, maybe something like 
5,000 in the United States, maybe 6,000 — I don’t know. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: Don’t look at me.  I don’t have any data. 
 
PAUL ROTH: Well, we only have our client list, and that stops at 
5,000. 
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[Laughter] 
But there are certainly fewer than 500 — and I’m tempted to say 
350, but I haven’t seen lists lately — that account for between 75 and 85 
percent of the assets under management.  So you’ve got a very, very 
highly concentrated industry, which, from my way of thinking about 
things, is one of the reasons why it makes a lot of sense for the SEC to 
differently approach the requirements for different advisers on the basis 
of their assets under management — on the basis of their strategy, on the 
basis of the riskiness, if you will, the interconnectedness for systemic 
purposes, of these advisers. 
Now, Audra asked me whether this kind of legislation would have 
an impact on whether people would find it easier or more difficult to 
raise money on a going-forward basis.  Intuitively, you’d say, “Well, if 
you’re registered, that should help you raise money” — and it may. 
But one of the interesting things that we’ve seen is the large 
institutional investors have not put that in the top five of their 
requirements as they look at investment managers in terms of what it is 
that they want to make sure these managers do.  They are much more 
concerned with the valuation procedures that these managers have, the 
operational procedures.  In fact, if registration was at the top of their list, 
all of the large managers would be registered, because these guys have 
the money. 
Roughly, I would say, half of the top 100 in terms of assets under 
management are already registered.  So we know that this is a scheme 
that can work. 
Let me just, for one moment, talk about things other than those that 
are in the advisers bill and go to the other parts of the Wall Street 
Reform Act that are going to have an impact on hedge fund managers. 
One, subjecting advisers to hedge funds at a $10 billion level of 
assets under management, whereas everybody else in the world is 
subjected to this at a $50 billion level of assets under management, 
assessments for the systemic dissolution fund.  Now, this is kind of like, 
in my view, taxation without representation.  I mean, at $10 billion 
you’re not going to be systemically relevant, but we want you to pay in.  
At $50 billion you may be.  Why?  I have a hunch it’s just because 
people think they don’t like hedge funds.  Why otherwise would hedge 
funds be forced to pay assessments at $10 billion while everybody else 
is at $50 billion? 
Secondly, subjecting hedge funds which are determined to require 
heightened prudential standards because of their interconnectedness or 
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their size to leverage concentration, liquidity, and risk management may 
be extremely relevant and important.  People don’t like it because they 
don’t like being subject to those things, but it may be relevant and 
important.  I’m not prepared to say that shouldn’t happen. 
However, it is an entirely different thing to say that if you are 
systemically relevant, and therefore subject to a regulator looking at you 
with respect to concentration, liquidity, and risk management, that you 
should also be subject to other requirements under the Bank Holding 
Company Act, such as restrictions on your activities and the requirement 
that you be forced to separate your financial activities and your 
nonfinancial activities.  The Act doesn’t do that.  Frankly, it makes very 
little sense to me that if you’re a non-depository institution you should 
be subject to those restrictions as well. 
Third, we’ve all heard complaints about compensation on Wall 
Street.  The hedge fund industry has not been known for being cheap 
when it comes to compensation.  But I can tell you, even though I 
haven’t done a survey, that not a lot of people are looking forward to 
Buddy and his colleagues determining whether or not “the incentive 
compensation structure of their funds is aligned with sound risk 
management structured to account for the time horizons of risks and 
meets such other criteria as federal regulators determine.”  In fact, 
buried within these 1279 pages it says that that’s what the SEC working 
with other federal regulators can and should do if they are dealing with a 
covered institution; and a registered investment adviser is a covered 
institution. 
Lastly, under the Consumer Protection Act, which is part of all of 
this, there is a new definition of fiduciary duty to make it applicable to 
brokers who are doing what supposedly is the same thing investment 
advisers would do.  I have a great concern that since 1940 or before, in 
terms of common law, we have been developing a body of law as to 
what are the requirements in the fiduciary duty of an investment adviser.  
Why Congress feels it’s necessary to throw that out and put in a new 
definition of what that fiduciary duty is, is beyond me.  It seems to me, if 
they want to make brokers subject to that fiduciary duty, they simply 
should say, “When you’re acting as an investment adviser, you should 
follow the requirements of the fiduciary duty under the Investment 
Advisers Act.” 
Lastly, two things. 
One, there is a provision in there that is applicable to investment 
advisers.  It changes the law with respect to aiding and abetting liability.  
2011] THE REGULATION OF INVESTMENT FUNDS 23 
It says right now that you can be liable for aiding and abetting if you 
“knowingly participate” in a fraud; this says “if you are reckless.”  I 
don’t know.  I don’t like that.  I think it’s in part because my wife 
sometimes says I’m reckless.  I just don’t — you know, it’s a little hard 
to define what “recklessness” is. 
The last thing is “the SEC is given enhanced authority regarding 
surveillance and risk assessment in the securities markets under the 
Advisers Act.”  I’m not sure I understand that.  I think they have enough 
ways to poke their way under the tent to find out what’s going on and 
that there is a different division which generally monitors what’s going 
on in the markets.  But it’s very interesting because it says that “at any 
time, and from time to time, the Commission can with respect to 
registered investment advisers get such reasonable periodic, special, or 
other information as they deem to be necessary.”  Very, very broad 
provisions. 
So I’ll turn it over to Matt at this point. 
 
MATTHEW SIANO: Thank you. 
Good morning.  As Professor Jalil mentioned, my name is Matthew 
Siano.  I’m the General Counsel of Two Sigma Investments and Two 
Sigma Advisers to hedge fund managers that are registered with the 
SEC, and I’m also the Corporate Secretary of Two Sigma Securities, 
which is a FINRA-registered broker-dealer.  So, as you probably have 
figured out, I’m at the crossroads of basically everything that’s in that 
book that Paul put out on the table. 
 
PAUL ROTH: You want it? 
 
MATTHEW SIANO: I have two copies. 
I was invited to speak here this morning because Professor Jalil 
believes I can faithfully represent the perspectives and opinions of 
managers and their in-house counsel who are out there every day trying 
to assess and plan for the fallout of these various hedge fund and other 
financial services regulations being pushed on Capitol Hill. 
Professor Jalil is hoping that I can cogently discuss whether the 
passage of, whether it be H.R. 4173 or Senate Bill 344 or any of their 
predecessors on both sides of the House — how they would put people 
like me and other in-house counsel in a professional position not 
dissimilar to where I sit on this panel, which is the government on one 
side, academics and practitioners on the other. 
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To fulfill my responsibilities to you and to him, I intend to use these 
opening remarks to briefly discuss which parts of these recent statutes or 
bills I think will cause internal counsels like myself the most concern, as 
well as which parts of the statutes I think are either beneficial, or 
certainly less problematic. 
I should note that these formal remarks will be relatively short, 
because I tend to favor the Q&A portions and the dialogue portions of 
these presentations.  So I’ll try to be brief. 
Before I begin, though, I would be remiss if I didn’t thank all of 
you for coming.  There’s nothing worse than coming and speaking to an 
empty room.  I also want to thank the Corporate and Financial Law 
Journal, Professor Jalil certainly, the Law School, and Dean Treanor.  I 
want to thank my firm, Two Sigma Investments, and in particular my 
associates Dana Sckolnick and Amy Pollack for helping me put these 
remarks together, because without them, frankly, I wouldn’t have 
anything to say. 
Just like Mr. Donohue started with, I have to also start with a 
couple of disclaimers.  While I think certainly Professor Jalil is happy to 
have me back and I’m happy to be a Fordham alum, I don’t speak for the 
Law School, I don’t speak for Two Sigma Investments, I certainly don’t 
speak for the SEC or either of the law firms or academics that are here.  
I don’t even speak for my wife and kids either.  And while I certainly 
hope my opinions are based on information and beliefs that are accurate 
and informed, I can’t guarantee that they will be accurate or informed.  
And nothing in here, obviously, is a solicitation for my firm or any of 
the funds that we manage, just to be clear. 
 
JAMES JALIL: I like the last part there. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: Well, you’re registered.  You can hold 
yourself out. 
 
MATTHEW SIANO: And finally, the topic of these remarks you 
should all know is really subject to constant change.  I mean, I think as 
all of us found, we were going to speak about certain bills, and then they 
changed, frankly, on us a couple weeks after we all met to talk about 
what we were going to talk about.  So you really do have to keep track 
of where the legislative process is and where Congress is really sort of 
going. 
So where do I begin?  I think I wouldn’t be doing my job this 
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morning if I didn’t state at the onset that not all of the parts of these bills 
are problematic. 
I don’t think that registration in and of itself is problematic for the 
industry.  I think Paul’s comment that the hedge fund industry is no 
longer a cottage industry is correct.  Frankly, registration would take one 
of the easy targets that hedge fund managers generally have off their 
backs, which is that they are somehow secretive and outside the 
regulatory regime; and, frankly, for the funds that are already registered, 
it may act as a barrier to entry, speaking just from a competitive 
advantage perspective for a moment, for those of us who are registered, 
if it puts up barriers to having other managers come in — I don’t have to 
compete as hard for those institutional dollars, so that’s terrific.  But I do 
think as a general matter for the markets, and certainly for the industry, I 
do think that registration is a positive thing and it’s something that we 
shouldn’t shy away from. 
Moreover, good managers want stable markets.  We want reduced 
systemic risks.  Good managers want a collaborative relationship, not 
only with Capitol Hill, but also with the folks on F Street and with the 
press.  We don’t want to be misperceived, mischaracterized, or 
misunderstood. 
Good managers also want the ability to pursue legitimate 
investment strategies and to be able to be seen as a value to the financial 
system, and not the sort of hidden root of the financial meltdown, which 
I don’t think is correct. 
Good managers also want clear rules that they can follow in 
confidence, and they want speedy enforcement against bad actors. 
Statutes that focus on, or even enhance, these components of the 
regulatory landscape are welcome.  That’s why I’m going to focus on 
the parts of the House and Senate bills that I think represent the greatest 
concerns for managers as well as the parts of the recent bills that I think 
are sensible and welcome. 
Let me be clear again that the general premise that investment 
managers should register with the SEC is not at the top of that list as 
being a problem. 
What is at the top of the list for me? 
Well, in my opinion, the most problematic of the concepts that I’ve 
seen in the recent bills are clearly the attempts to either register the 
funds themselves or to act in some way to prevent what the funds can 
do.  While this is an important distinction, it’s not actually drawn out 
very clearly in a lot of the press clippings that you read.  You generally 
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hear “registration of hedge funds,” and what they’re most of the time 
really referring to is registration of the managers of those funds. 
It’s bills that look to actually register the investment funds 
themselves that I think are more problematic.  Take for example the 
previous Senate Bill 344, which attempted to register the funds 
themselves, albeit a “registration-lite” version. While they may appear 
innocuous on the surface, I think they’re a slippery slope toward some of 
the potential things that Paul identified, which would be limitations of 
the types of strategies, limitations of the types of activities that the funds 
themselves can actually engage in, and I think it’s those things that will 
have a detrimental impact on the capital markets generally, as well as for 
investors. 
This is clearly the biggest concern among hedge fund managers 
because it has the potential to disrupt not only the profitability of the 
industry, which certainly is near and dear to all of our hearts, but it’s 
also the innovation that I think has really defined the industry.  The 
industry is an innovative industry.  There’s a reason that people leave 
well-established investment houses to go out on their own and be 
entrepreneurs and start new firms. 
I don’t think that it’s hyperbole to say that these attempts to register 
funds and potentially subject them to the limitations — whether it be of 
the Investment Company Act or control over compensation or some of 
the parts that are laid out in the House bill — to say they belong in the 
same category as measures designed to outlaw short selling or other 
ideas to prevent the use of leverage or restrict trading frequency or 
institute trading taxes.  They all seem to be attempts to actually curtail 
legitimate trading activities. 
Nobody in the hedge fund space that is a legitimate actor is saying 
hedge funds should be allowed to engage in insider trading or market 
manipulation.  What they are saying is, “we should be allowed to engage 
in investment strategies that are legitimate and do add to the capital 
markets.” 
Additionally, I see these types of statutes as a tacit abandonment of 
the basic premise that sophisticated investors, be they accredited 
investors or qualified clients or qualified purchasers, are able to act on 
their own and appraise their own risk-reward profiles for particular 
investments.  I believe that any retreat towards a regime of regulators 
deciding what investment product strategies are appropriate for investors 
is not only fraught with peril but I don’t actually think it’s operable, to 
use the term that Paul used. 
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The second category of proposals that I believe are of grave 
concern to hedge fund managers are rules that require the disclosure of 
sensitive proprietary and valueable information about funds, their 
investors, and their activities.  Such proposals present at least four 
interconnected problems: 
• The type of information that’s being demanded; 
• The volume of the information that’s being requested; 
• With whom this information is going to be shared; and 
• For what is this type of information going to be used. 
On the type of information, several of the recent bills in both houses 
of the Capitol call for hedge fund managers, unlike managers of mutual 
funds in most cases and certainly managed accounts, to disclose among 
other things investor names, fund trading practices, investment 
positions, and leverage levels, all of which are in fact highly confidential 
and highly proprietary because they can be used to reverse-engineer the 
actual strategies that are being used by the managers. 
While some of this information certainly would be relevant to the 
government’s attempts to assess systemic risks that are the purported 
roots of many of these pieces of legislation, other pieces would not and 
would do little but impose burdensome and potentially fatal disclosure 
obligations on legitimate investment managers. 
I think the panel has already drilled down on some of the 
problematic terms that we are talking about. 
When you’re talking about how much leverage an investment firm 
— let’s say one based in SoHo — is using on behalf of its clients, that’s 
a very difficult thing to define, whether it’s because you’re talking about 
explicit leverage, the actual borrowing of funds, whether it be from a 
brokerage house or a bank, or whether you’re talking about using 
particular types of investment instruments that within them have 
tremendous amounts of “embedded leverage.”  I’m not sure, frankly, if I 
were asked to do that — I don’t know how I would define it within my 
own firm, let alone if I were working at the Commission trying to tell 
other people how to do it. 
On the volume prong, I don’t believe there’s a true appreciation for 
the amount of data that the government is going to be inundated with.  I 
shouldn’t necessarily speak for Mr. Donohue and his team, but I 
certainly can see from the Form SH, which was an attempt to collect 
short sale information, that we were producing tremendous amounts of 
data and sending it along, and I’m not sure how much of that was 
actually processible or usable. 
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While I certainly applaud the desire of the Commission and the 
Federal Reserve, as well as what other agencies the government elects to 
create, to understand basic information about our industry and how it has 
grown from its obscure beginnings into a more substantial market 
participant, I question how well this information can be digested and 
used. 
I also don’t believe that the Commission appreciates the time and 
cost of producing any of these reports.  I shouldn’t paint with such a 
broad brush.  I’m sure there are certainly people who do appreciate it, 
but there is a tremendous amount of time and energy that goes into the 
production of these things. 
If the process of producing Form SH is any indicator, managers will 
expend tremendous resources to transmit information to the SEC and/or 
its designees, regardless of the impact said reports may have on the 
bottom line. 
On the audience prong — in other words, the people who are 
actually going to see this information — under congressional proposals, 
whether it’s H.R. 3818, which is the predecessor bill, or Senate 344, not 
only would hedge fund managers have to disclose this kind of 
information to the government, but also to existing prospective 
investors, counterparties, and creditors, along with in one of those earlier 
bills “any other entity that the Commission identifies as having systemic 
risk responsibility.”  Well, does that include the exchanges?  Does that 
include the brokerage houses that are regulated?  I’m not sure where that 
was going to go. 
I think the critical distinction to make is that some of the bills now 
are addressing the disclosure to the government, which I think is a 
legitimate exercise, and the disclosure to other participants in the 
marketplace, who may be able to use that information to actively work 
against the interests not only of my firm but of its clients. 
To quote former Representative Richard Baker, the current CEO of 
the Managed Funds Association, which is the trade association that Paul 
referenced down in Washington representing the funds on the Hill: 
“Public disclosure of much of the information sought under these bills 
would be like asking Colonel Sanders to disclose the secret spices for his 
fried chicken.”  While it’s certainly fair to tell, using the analogy of 
food, the Food and Drug Administration what’s going in to make sure 
you’re not poisoning the public, it’s a very different thing to be sharing 
that with its competitors, or even the people who aren’t necessarily 
consuming the product. 
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I believe that H.R. 4173 still has some of these problems, as Paul 
has already pointed out and I’m sure will be discussed by the other two 
speakers. 
On the use front, I’m also concerned about the lack of limitation on 
the use of that information when it’s disclosed to the government. 
I’m also concerned about when government officials, frankly, leave 
public practice and head back into private practice.  I don’t think it’s 
being paranoid for investment managers to be concerned about the 
information about their strategies, the way they manage money, for 
whom they manage money, to be worried about that information then 
being used when people leave the government to go into private 
practice. 
While I’m encouraged by language in 4173 that provides for, 
among other things, explicit protection from FOIA requests and the 
deletion of certain information, I’m still concerned about some of the 
use limitations that I don’t see. 
The third, and probably the final, major concern I have when I read 
these statutes is the unclear rules that I see when I read through them.  I 
trust that the SEC and Congress are aware, but maybe not, that unclear 
rules only compound the difficult jobs that CCOs and general counsels 
have in trying to carry out the objectives of these regulations. 
While I certainly applaud statements like the need for anti-money-
laundering processes and procedures, not defining those regulations or 
other items like them — like the definition of what a “client” is and the 
definition of “leverage” and some of the other things we’ve talked about 
— only leads us to scramble. 
I certainly believe that CCOs and general counsels want to do the 
right thing.  I certainly believe that, not only because they have personal 
liability, certainly in the case of the CCOs, but just because I don’t 
believe personally that people get into the hedge fund industry to 
become a crook.  The vast majority of people in the industry are actually 
entrepreneurs who are actually trying to do the right thing. 
So what are some of the positives, after I’ve spent ten minutes 
railing against what’s going on down in Washington? 
Again, I think it’s important to state that regulation takes the target 
off the hedge fund industry’s back.  Whether we talk about regulating all 
the hedge fund managers as well as all the private equity managers or all 
the venture capital managers, I think at the end of the day it’s important 
to recognize that registration takes one of the easy criticisms that’s 
leveled at the industry off the table.  As to how we go about doing that, 
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there’s certainly room for debate, and we’re certainly going to talk about 
that later today, but I think it’s important to recognize that the idea that 
this is, potentially, a major win for what we do is not to be lost among 
all the discussion. 
I also like the fact that there are clear custody requirements being 
built into some of these statutes.  The fact that you have to actually 
maintain other people’s money appropriately I think is something that 
we shouldn’t lose sight of. 
I like the fact that there are escalations of the definitional amounts 
that make you qualify as an accredited investor or a qualified client or a 
qualified purchaser.  I find it interesting that in some statutes they fix 
one of them, but they don’t fix the other two.  However, I do think 
escalating all of these definitions — for example, the accredited investor 
one was set in 1982, I think was the last time it was raised, and back 
then $200,000 was a real salary.  Now that amount is still real, but it is 
certainly capturing many more people than it did in the past. 
I think the fact that they are trying to codify best practices is 
admirable.  I certainly take Paul’s point that if the funds’ records are 
now my records as an investment adviser, that certainly puts a greater 
burden on me.  However, I think what you’d find is that most of the 
investment managers out there, pick their administrator or pick their 
prime broker very carefully and are, frankly, relying on those records to 
produce audited financial statements and their performance numbers, 
and I think I’m, surprisingly, not as concerned about the extension of 
that responsibility to force accountability for what’s in those records.  
There is certainly risk there, it’s certainly not something that we would 
do lightly, but I do think it represents, frankly, what most of us are doing 
anyway. 
Government accountability — I think this is one thing that I very 
much liked in the House bill.  I liked the fact that Congress was going to 
look into how was this information being used and was actually going to 
circle back after a certain period of time to say: “Okay.  You’ve been 
given all this information.  What did you do with it?”  I think that’s 
helpful.  I think that certainly lowers some of the concern that you hear 
in the industry about the government either is out of touch or they’re not 
concerned about the cost that this is going to put on us.  That actually 
goes a long way to being able to point to it and say: “Look, they put this 
in a piece of legislation; they clearly are thinking about that.” 
I also think synchronization among the regulators, whether it be 
domestic regulators or international regulators, is a good thing.  The idea 
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that it’s clear that information sharing will happen between the Federal 
Reserve and the Commission under some of these bills, the CFTC under 
other bills, and, as Buddy introduced, the FSA component or the 
international component, that’s certainly helpful.  It would be helpful if 
the government were going to do that on a lot of different levels. 
Last but not least, I think the House bill certainly does a good job of 
eliminating some of the sillier provisions that I think still sit in the Dodd 
bill: 
• The distinction between a fund being formed in Delaware versus 
being formed in the Caymans — I think there shouldn’t really be a 
distinction between those two things.  I’m happy to see that come out. 
• And again, the fact that it’s codifying the idea that you need to 
keep records and that you can justify to senior management that 
expending resources to have good retention systems is important, 
because it’s in the bill, actually goes a long way to making our lives 
easier. 
Let me close by thanking Professor Jalil and the Corporate and 
Financial Law Journal again for the opportunity to offer my thoughts, 
and I certainly welcome the Q&A portion and the discussion portion of 
the panel. 
 
JAMES JALIL: Thank you. 
Professor? 
 
J.W. VERRET: Thanks.  I want to thank everyone for coming.  
Thanks to Audra for setting up this panel and doing a fantastic job with 
all the logistics. 
Professor Jalil and this notable panel — I think this crew has 
probably forgotten more about hedge funds than I’ve ever known, so I 
won’t purport to tell you anything about the hedge fund industry.  But I 
will offer a bit more of an academic perspective, which to me that word 
means the most important thing, contrary to probably conventional 
wisdom on that, and also a perspective of someone who works for a 
think-tank that operates in D.C., which we should all be aware of, the 
Mercatus Center.  Mercatus is Latin for markets, free markets.  We take 
a free-market advocacy perspective in engaging with regulators and with 
members of Congress.  It’s a tough row to hoe these days.  It’s a tough, 
kind of a hard sell, but that’s the perspective that I’m going to offer 
today. 
One of my favorite quotes from Ronald Reagan is: “The problem 
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with Washington, the problem with the culture of Washington, is this: 
it’s the idea that if it moves we should tax, and if it keeps moving then 
we should regulate, and if it stops moving then we should subsidize it.” 
I think one of the problems with what we are seeing and one of the 
problems with what we are going to see in regulation of the hedge fund 
industry, both by the SEC, and by other financial regulators, is the way 
we’re going to tax hedge funds — and they’re going to tax you, don’t 
worry; if you keep moving they’re going to tax you — is I think all three 
of these problems: it’s regulation, it’s taxation, and regulatory subsidy as 
well. 
Now, just to throw out the general critiques of hedge fund 
regulation, what happens if we get the cost-benefit analysis wrong and 
we over-regulate?  Generally, I think that the general criticisms include 
that: 
• We’ll see more offshore flight; we’ll see firms try to find some 
other jurisdiction where they can get a better deal, although that might 
be a little bit harder these days than it was in 2003 and 2004; 
• We’ll see costs to liquidity and to the price-discovery function of 
the capital markets; and 
• We’ll see some false bonding as well, we’ll see the notion that 
“Look, we’re registered, so we’re safe.”  We’ve seen, I think, to some 
extent that might not necessarily be always the best inference, but 
sometimes markets take that inference from the bonding effects of 
registration and regulation. 
Proponents of hedge fund registration and regulation assert a couple 
of things.  I think we’ve seen quite a great deal of confusion about the 
objective of these changes in the law. 
Is it about Madoff or is it about Bear Stearns? — That’s the issue.  
Is it systemic risk or is it fraud prevention? 
The SEC has a history of statutory mandate and some technical 
expertise for dealing with fraud after the fact.  The SEC has some ability 
with  preventing fraud, some ability with it, but a mixed record, I think, 
with fraud prevention. 
With systemic risk, the SEC has no expertise whatsoever.  The SEC 
has some expertise with dealing with issues of credit between a 
regulated party and the folks that loan money to them, making sure that 
that credit risk is appropriate for the profile of the investors in that 
institution.  However, in terms of systemic risk, in terms of the domino 
effect on parties that deal with the parties that deal with the parties, 
many of whom aren’t necessarily SEC-regulated, the SEC doesn’t have 
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any expertise.  That is the province of the macroeconomists.  One of the 
problems with the SEC is there aren’t enough macroeconomists at the 
SEC; there are too many darn lawyers. 
So I think we have to consider the real objective of all of this. 
Now, to the extent the objective is fraud prevention, the reason I’m 
here is I’m an advocate of self-regulation in the financial services sector.  
I think it generally tends to be a good way to go.  I think we have a 
mixed history of self-regulation in the financial services sector. 
Now, critics of self-regulation will tell you that it fails.  To use the 
phrase that Roosevelt used when he picked, coincidentally, Joe Kennedy 
to be the first chair of the SEC, it’s the fox guarding the henhouse.  And 
it’s even worse, they’ll say, in self-regulation because it’s subject to 
regulatory capture; firms take it over and use it to keep smaller firms 
out, and they won’t really regulate at all; self-regulation isn’t real 
regulation, it’s toothless. 
Well, I think sometimes that happens just because the self-
regulatory organization or the self-regulatory strategy is designed to fail 
from the very beginning.  That’s how I would describe, for instance, the 
consolidated supervised entity program at the SEC to oversee 
investment banks.  I wouldn’t really call that self-regulation.  I think that 
was designed to fail from the very beginning, but I think if you design it 
right, self-regulation can work, and it can work for two reasons. 
First of all, with respect to internal competition for capital between 
funds, I think you can develop what the economists call a sort of 
Prisoner’s Dilemma situation, Nash equilibrium.  Anybody who has 
seen NYPD Blue or one of the cop shows knows about the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma.  You put two suspects that are co-conspirators in a crime in 
different rooms and you tell each of them, “Look, if you confess you’ll 
get some time, but not as much as the person that doesn’t confess.”  If 
they could only collude, if they could only both agree not to talk, they 
could both walk.  But because they want to get the slightly better deal, 
one of them talks, they both go to jail — the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  If you 
set up the dynamics of the self-regulatory organization right, you get the 
same sort of Prisoner’s Dilemma in the types of regulation that you see 
the SRO promulgating. 
Now, with respect to external competition for capital, I think 
everybody’s on the same page.  The hedge fund sector wants to get 
money from people that might otherwise invest in other asset classes, so 
they want to promote the integrity of the hedge fund sector as a sector 
more generally.  So I think a much easier sort of incentive is set up 
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there. 
Alternatively, you could have the SEC do it, but there will be some 
problems with it. 
• First of all, there is a problem, frankly, of knowledge of what’s 
going on the ground — I think the SRO is going to have more expertise. 
• There’s a problem of the Administrative Procedures Act.  If you 
want to act quickly to stop something that you see on the horizon, the 
APA delays your ability to rule-make — and there are reasons why it 
tries to slow things down, but it does slow things down, where the SRO 
can potentially act a little bit more quickly. 
• There are also, of course, public choice constraints on regulators 
acting.  We see a lot of different incentives faced by bureaucrats in 
making regulation, and it doesn’t necessarily always relate to the public 
interest.  There’s some element of careerism; there’s some element of 
“We’re regulators, we should regulate; and if we want our budget to 
grow over time, we should regulate more; and if there has been a crisis, 
we should say, ‘Well, the only reason why we didn’t stop the crisis is 
because we couldn’t regulate more.  Just let us regulate more stuff and 
everything will be okay.’” 
So if I were to design a self-regulatory organization for the hedge 
fund sector, what would I do?  Now, I think this is in some ways sort of 
academic, but academic ideas can have real power in securities laws.  If 
you like, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) was the 
result of Professor Weiss, who just wrote an article.  If I were to change 
private regulation, here are five ideas of what I would do.  Congress cut 
and pasted from his article and put it into legislation and now we have 
the PSLRA. 
Now, I don’t have anything of nearly that force or power, but I offer 
something in the same respect, and I think going forward, as we see the 
SEC continue to grow in its regulation of hedge funds, potentially — 
God forbid — a Company Act-type legislation or just growth of 
Investment Advisers legislation, I think we’ll see the pendulum also 
swing in the other direction, as it always does in securities regulation.  
Maybe, hopefully, the next chairman will be more of a deregulatory 
chairman, appointed by maybe a different president, and we’ll start 
thinking about exemptive relief. 
I think we can talk about exemptive relief along something like 
these lines: 
• First of all, I would make sure that the SRO has term limits for the 
members that govern the SRO and set rules for the SRO. 
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• I think the SEC should have an important role in vetting nominees 
to the SRO, making sure, for instance, to vet the nominees for diversity 
of fund strategy and for size.  You don’t want a couple of large funds to 
use the SRO as a vehicle to maintain their dominance of the industry, 
and you don’t want to create rules that promote one asset strategy over 
another, so you want to make sure there’s some diversity in terms of 
company size and asset strategy in terms of the sort of companies that 
get to have a role in the SRO. 
• You’d want an independent budget. 
• You’d want some sort of independent enforcement. 
• The one thing I think we really need in terms of SROs more 
generally is a standard of review when the SEC reviews rules made by 
the SRO, some sort of an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, such 
that the SEC cannot dominate the SRO rule-making process, I think the 
way it does now.  So I think some sort of a statutory limitation on the 
SEC’s ability to overturn rules or to mandate that the SRO promulgate 
certain types of rules. 
We’ve seen some bit of promulgation of best practices.  Of course, 
the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets convened investors 
and convened a group of hedge fund advisers to put together some best 
practices.  I think that’s a beginning for what we could see the SRO do. 
The United Kingdom started with a bit of a stronger, I think, self-
regulatory approach, and is still sort of thinking how it wants hedge fund 
regulation to work.  But the Hedge Fund Standards Board has 
promulgated a lot of rules in the United Kingdom, and I think the United 
Kingdom, at least, is taking a milder approach than Europe, the 
European Directive.  The House of Lords was very critical of the 
European Directive on hedge fund regulation because they’re concerned 
about competitive issues. 
I think to that extent we might have an opportunity here.  If the 
United Kingdom ends up going in the direction of Europe, I think we 
might have a competitive opportunity to make sure maybe we become 
the lighter regulatory regime and we continue to be the great 
international competitive forum for these types of, I think, very 
important funds and assets. 
Now, with respect to systemic risk, again I don’t think the SEC has 
the expertise to engage, and to the extent that it becomes a source of 
information for other regulators directly focused on systemic risk, I 
think that the mission of the SEC will, frankly, be threatened.  They 
don’t have the toolkit to do it, so why should we expect them to take the 
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lead on information-gathering for systemic risk issues? 
With respect to the Dodd bill, I’ve been privileged to work with 
Senator Corker’s staff on this bill.  Depending on your point of view, 
he’s either the Republican defector or the Republican voice of 
compromise.  I think we can have faith with him to keep Senator Dodd 
honest on this and be helpful.  I think this compromise will eventually 
minimize some of the damage of some of the burdensome regulations 
included. 
But I would want to build on, I think, Matt’s comment and Paul’s 
comment about information and the proprietary trading concerns about 
information gathering. 
One of the exemptions in the Senate bill, in the Dodd version at 
least — I don’t know if it’s in the House version or not — is an 
exemption for Congress from confidentiality requirements.  So anything 
in the SEC, Congress can get their hands on. 
Now, you might call me a conspiracy theorist, but one thing we 
have definitely seen in the securities litigation context is private 
plaintiffs say: “Oh no, we can’t get access to this information through 
the discovery process because of some evidentiary limitations, some 
procedural limitations.  Here’s what we can do: Congress is not subject 
to these limitations.  Let’s donate and develop a dialogue with members 
on House oversight and Senate oversight, and let’s get them to do an 
investigation into some firm, let’s get them to get the evidence we need, 
and then, because it’s now part of the public record, we can use it to 
prosecute our private plaintiff litigation.” 
I think in the same vein, if I was a clever hedge fund, I’d make 
friends with some people on House oversight and Senate oversight.  I’d 
get them to get the information from the SEC and I’d get access to it 
ahead of time and trade on it.  Or I would just get it out in the open to 
destroy a competitor.  There is nothing whatsoever illegal about that.  
Trading based on knowledge you get from members of Congress is not 
subject to the insider trading rules. 
Now, there’s a law that has been proposed in the House, the so-
called STOCK Act, Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, that 
I actually testified against for different reasons, that would limit your 
ability to trade on information you gain from Congress.  But that law, I 
think, is probably going to go nowhere.  I don’t think the STOCK Act is 
going to pass.  I think it’s one of those sort of “milker bills” that you just 
put forward with knowledge that you’re going to take it back later in 
exchange for donations.  But that’s another thing. 
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So I think you can definitely use the congressional exception to 
some effect.  I think that’s maybe just one example of the threat that 
Matt was mentioning. 
So that’s hedge fund registration and regulation.  I know that’s the 
topic of this panel.  Let me just take a minute and a half to go off the 
reservation and tell you a little bit about what else is coming that’s going 
to affect — it’s maybe not hedge fund regulation, but regulation 
affecting hedge funds. 
• Short sales restrictions.  You probably know a lot about that.  
That’s likely to come down the pipeline, I would imagine.  I don’t know 
quite what form it will take, the uptick rule, or the so-called “circuit 
breaker” and then uptick or alternative uptick, modified uptick, but in 
some fashion we’ll see restrictions on short sales.  The world seems to 
blame, in part, the financial crisis on short sellers for some reason, I 
think.  My own personal view is I think short sales are great, they help 
price discovery, and I think sometimes they pop asset bubbles.  Long 
bias in the securities markets and long bias in regulation of the securities 
markets is not something that helps any of us.  In other words — maybe 
it’s a bold statement — I think that a company that can’t survive a bear 
raid doesn’t deserve to survive.  But to that extent limitations and 
restrictions on your ability to short sell are going to limit your ability to 
hedge.  To the extent that hedge funds really do hedging anymore — I 
don’t know  how big that is in your industry — but if you can’t hedge, 
then you don’t take the long position either, so that limits again liquidity 
and price discovery. 
• Taxation.  Well, President Obama’s budget released early this 
month includes a provision to tax carried interest as income rather than 
as capital gains, tax your performance fees as income.  Obviously, that’s 
not going to be very much fun.  I don’t think that’s going to go 
anywhere this year because Senator Baucus is very adamant that he 
thinks this is going to stifle growth and he doesn’t want to stifle growth 
during a recession, which I think is probably wise.  But as the recession 
fades but the deficit remains, I think we have a very real threat of this 
change in carried interest taxation going forward.  Now, the good news 
is they’re probably going to raise capital gains taxes anyway, so it might 
not make much difference to you.  But that’s likely. 
There’s also a transaction tax in the works, tax every single trade in 
the securities market, the so-called Make Wall Street Pay for Wall 
Street’s Bailout Act.  I don’t know how likely it is, but I know the 
Chamber of Commerce is worried about it and lobbying heavily against 
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it.  So to the ordinary mom-and-pop investor it might not be a big deal, it 
would be a very small percentage, but to the high-volume investor 
obviously the transaction tax would be a really big deal. 
• I also think that there will be some changes in proxy access that 
will be very important for those of you that engage in activist hedge 
fund strategies — sort of buy shares and rattle the saber for changes in 
publicly traded companies.  My understanding right now from 
discussions with the folks on the Hill and staff and lobbyists on this 
issue is that unions were obviously big proponents of proxy access.  
Proxy access is still being redesigned by the folks at Corporate Finance 
and might or might not be part of the Dodd bill, depending, I think, on 
the outcome of negotiations between Corker and Dodd this weekend.  
But one of the concerns that has developed within the union side is that 
they’re concerned about hedge funds using proxy access.  God forbid 
hedge funds should put nominees on the board that would downsize and 
that would put assets at more productive uses elsewhere.  So I think we 
might see some changes in the holding period restrictions and in the 
percentage ownership minimums to try to edge hedge funds out.  I don’t 
know quite how they’ll try to do it.  I don’t know how you can empower 
union shareholders but not hedge funds.  But rest assured the union 
lobby is looking for a way at this point, so I think we might see some 
changes in proxy access that reflect that. 
So if it moves they’re going to tax it, if it keeps moving they’re 
going to regulate it, and at some point if it stops moving maybe they’ll 
try to subsidize it. 
I hope that has all been useful.  Again, I appreciate the opportunity 
to talk to all of you today. 
 
JAMES JALIL: Thank you. 
Holland? 
 
HOLLAND WEST: Thank you. 
That was great.  There is a reason why they made me sit to the left 
of Professor Verret.  I did enjoy your comments. 
I’ve made a career off the private fund and derivatives business, 
and I’m a big proponent of the business, but I’m not an apologist for the 
industry. I honestly believe that some intelligent, meaningful, 
disciplined transparency and oversight is needed in this business, and 
that has been the case since the mid-1990s. 
To me it’s critical to rebuild the trust in the financial services 
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business.  The business simply can’t be ignored.  It’s too big and 
important to price discovery, liquidity, and capital flows.  It’s in no 
one’s interest to bring the financial system to its knees again or to put 
systemic participants at risk.  That’s just my personal view on this whole 
thing.  At the same time, I do believe it needs to be intelligent and 
meaningful and that it works fairly for all participants as well as the 
regulators. 
What I’d like to do in finishing up, because much of what I could 
cover here has been touched upon, but I’d like to just fill in the gaps on 
some of the things that have not received as much attention. 
The Administration’s proposal included no significant exemption 
from investment adviser registration, except for very limited ones for 
small investment advisers with limited assets under management and 
number of clients — basically, a de minimis exemption. 
Secondly, certain foreign investment advisers that Paul talked about 
with limited U.S. business and contacts.  Accordingly, investment 
advisers to many different kinds of private pools of capital are going to 
be required to be registered and regulated under the various acts.  That 
would include advisers to hedge funds, commodity pools, venture 
capital funds, private equity funds, buyout funds, real estate funds, funds 
of funds, and then, lastly, CDOs and other structured finance and 
securitization vehicles. 
There is a heightened stridency in Washington and elsewhere on 
anything remotely perceived as a loophole.  There is a lot of noise being 
made, a lot of lobbying going on.  We’re going to see how things sort 
out over time, but the bills that we’ve been talking about, the House bill 
and the Dodd proposal or discussion draft, are likewise broad, but you 
do see some exemptions working their way into the process at this point. 
What I’d like to do is focus really on some of the non-hedge-fund-
related investment advisers and what this all means to them, as well as 
the foreign advisers who are not getting a lot of attention due to just our 
parochial view of this here in the United States.  And again, some of this 
has been touched upon, so I’m not going to go into all of the detail. 
First, small managers — “small- and mid-sized managers” I think is 
the term.  Both the House bill and the Dodd bill — and I’ll refer to it as 
“the Dodd bill”; it’s a discussion draft, not a bill — as Paul pointed out, 
substantially increase the amount of assets under management necessary 
for federal registration. 
The House bill, again as Paul said, provides an exemption for an 
adviser to a private fund if each of the private funds under management 
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has less than $150 million.  Now, accordingly, a fund manager could 
have much more than $150 million under management, so long as each 
private fund has less than $150 million. 
The Dodd bill raises the level to $100 million, and that’s without 
reference to private funds at all.  Now, those small advisers would be 
subject to federal recordkeeping and reporting requirements and would 
be — I thought Paul did a great job talking about the issues about state 
registration — subject to state registration. 
In light of the fact that this increase has come up in these bills, it’s 
highly likely that final legislation is going to raise the minimum 
requirement, or rather the minimum amount of assets under 
management, for federal registration. 
Now, the same for so-called mid-sized fund managers.  The House 
bill provides that in prescribing regulations the SEC is supposed to take 
into account size, governance, and investment strategy.  Honestly, I 
think it’s going to be very difficult — and Paul said this as well — for 
the SEC to adopt any sort of meaningful guidance and rules in that 
regard as to what that means. 
Secondly, let me address family offices.  I don’t think that has been 
mentioned today.  There are a lot of family offices — single-family 
offices, multiple-family offices — that operate where they invest in the 
alternative industry.  By their very terms, under the Obama proposal 
they would have been required to register.  The Dodd bill would 
completely exempt family offices from registration and reporting 
requirements.  What the bill does not do, however, is define what a 
“family office” is, leaving it to the SEC to define that term.  It remains 
to be seen how that will be defined and what attributes family office has. 
Now let me get to some of the more controversial and actually, 
honestly, more important people in the industry, the venture capital and 
private equity folks. 
Commentators and fund industry lobbyists have argued that these 
vehicles pose far less systemic risk than hedge funds, and therefore they 
needn’t be registered. 
Curiously enough, in January 2009 the Group of Thirty, financial 
regulators and bankers, issued a report where they called for subjecting 
the managers of private pools of capital that employ significant leverage 
to regulation and registration.  The Group of Thirty report also exempted 
out venture capital funds — and venture capital funds were the only 
ones named — presumably on the notion that they were less reliant on 
leverage. 
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Both the House bill and the Dodd bill completely exempt managers 
of venture capital funds from registration, but they do require the 
venture capital managers to be subject to recordkeeping and reporting as 
the SEC will determine.  So in that regard the SEC has to determine 
what those requirements are and, secondly, to define what a “venture 
capital fund” is.  I’m going to get to that in a minute.  So it remains to be 
seen how limited or how expansive any such definition would be. 
This segues into private equity.  The Dodd bill, unlike the House 
bill, exempts registration of an adviser to a private equity fund, again 
leaving the SEC the task of defining what a “private equity fund” is.  
Those advisers would be subject to recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements, again as the SEC would deem to be necessary and 
advisable to protect investors in the market. 
Now, there are a couple of things here. 
• One is, what is a “private equity fund” and what are the attributes?  
There have been some commentators that have said, “A private equity 
fund can be defined as an entity having a two-plus-year lockup. Simply 
that.” There are probably some other attributes that should be introduced 
into this analysis as well. 
Likewise, if the SEC, both for venture capital funds and private 
equity funds, gets to the point of defining what are those recordkeeping 
and reporting requirements.  Assuming — and that’s a big assumption 
— that actually there will be an exemption for these folks at the end of 
the day, there could be very rigorous reporting requirements, and 
therefore these people who enjoy an exemption from registration could 
still be subject to a bit of regulation. 
Now, let me focus on an area that also hasn’t been touched upon 
today, and that’s real estate advisers.  Those are advisers giving real-
estate-focused advice in funds.  The reason that’s important here is, 
clearly, there are certain assets, such as real estate assets, that don’t 
constitute securities under the securities laws.  However, if part of the 
business of a manager is advising with respect to securities of a real 
estate fund, they are going to be swept into this whole regime. 
For example, if an adviser is advising a real estate fund on cash 
flow from investor subscriptions and proceeds prior to payment of 
expenses and distribution and withdrawals — if there are withdrawals, 
but mostly distribution — it’s likely that they might be investing in 
securities. 
Secondly, if a fund’s program involves lending of any sort of debt 
acquisition, such as direct lending or mezzanine debt or requiring 
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participation interest in loans, that could be deemed to be securities as 
well.  There are definitional issues here. 
If a fund acquires limited partnership interest or any sort of interest 
in a real estate asset or certain real estate assets, if they acquire securities 
in a REIT, or if they acquire mortgage-backed securities, that constitutes 
giving advice with respect to securities. 
Now, in these registration requirements there is no primary business 
exception, or de minimis exception, as to how many securities you 
would have to give advice with regard to would be swept under the 
regime. 
So what’s a real estate manager to hope for?  A couple of things: 
• One is there could be a lobbying effort to get real estate managers 
their own exemption from registration.  There’s no indication of that, but 
it’s certainly something that people have thought about. 
• Probably the most likely hope for the real estate managers, if any, 
and even if one is desired or deemed necessary, is that they could fall 
under some exemption that the private equity fund managers would fall 
under, if in fact there is one. 
Real estate funds are very much like private equity funds.  They 
have similarities in attributes like an initial offering and no continuous 
offering, accepting capital on a capital commitment basis and investing 
that capital, a limited investment period where investments are made and 
commitments are drawn down, multiple-year terms, and no liquidity 
events, no voluntary redemptions.  I would submit that some of those 
attributes, as opposed to a single lockup period, is a better way to 
approach it, if there is an exemption to be had, on what attributes of 
venture capital and private equity funds and real estate funds should be 
looked at in that regard. 
Regarding non-U.S. investment advisers, there has not been a lot of 
focus on this.  It was mentioned earlier, but both proposals have a very 
broad extraterritorial effect.  Fund managers, even if based overseas and 
with limited U.S. investing, are required to register if the fund assets 
attributable to U.S. clients exceed a particular threshold. 
Now, there is the exemption that Paul described, and I’m going to 
give you a few details on this because it is important to a lot of people, 
including U.S. advisers with affiliates, but then many, many offshore 
advisers as well. 
The exemption is for a “foreign private adviser.”  Now, that is 
defined as such an adviser has no place of business in the United States, 
doesn’t hold itself out generally to the public in the United States as an 
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investment adviser, and has fewer than 15 clients in the United States, 
and — and it’s an “and,” conjunctive — assets under management 
attributable to U.S. clients of less than $25 million, or a higher amount if 
the SEC were to determine to raise that amount.  A couple of curious 
things on this: 
It’s unclear what “client” means.  We haven’t gotten into that 
precisely.  We’ve alluded to it today.  But that has always been an issue 
that has been debated, as to whether a client is the fund itself or the 
investors in a fund.  There’s a specific rule that treats a fund as one 
client, but that has been up for debate all through the 2000s. 
The House bill specifically prohibits the SEC from defining “client” 
as investors in a fund.  The Dodd bill does not include that. 
As to how that’s going to work its way into legislation, if at all, or 
into regulation remains to be seen, but we think that there probably, with 
everything that has happened, there probably is a high likelihood that 
clients are going to be defined in a much more expansive way. 
Two things.  The proposed legislation requires that a foreign private 
adviser have no place of business in the United States, whereas prior 
SEC guidance has allowed for a registration exemption for an adviser 
having a principal place of business outside the United States and fewer 
than 15 clients. 
Secondly, assuming a look-through to fund investors when counting 
clients, which I think is a reasonably predictable feature of the final 
legislation and the SEC rule-making, a non-U.S. investment adviser with 
a relatively limited scope of U.S. relationships is going to be subject to 
registration and regulation. 
One troubling aspect of this for the foreign advisers is that because 
it doesn’t appear; it does disqualify a non-U.S. investment adviser from 
the exemption if it has either 15 or more clients or $25 million or more 
in U.S. client investments.  Now, the practical application of that is a 
U.S. institutional investor with $25 million, one investor with $25 
million, is going to require the registration of that adviser. 
Now, let me just switch gears really quickly.  The last area I want to 
cover is custody.  We have alluded to that, and that’s a very important 
area. 
For some time, custody has been under discussion for upgraded 
requirements and expanded application.  Primarily due to the Madoff 
and other frauds and other misconduct in recent years, there has been a 
renewed focus and some significant traction in this area.  So what I 
would like to do is just quickly focus on the significant changes in the 
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custody world, which I think were a long time coming, and how it 
affects the private investment funds.  There are lots of details here. 
The Dodd bill provides specifically that “the SEC shall prescribe 
rules for all registered investment advisers to use independent 
custodians.”  Likewise, the House Financial Services Committee passed 
the Investor Protection Act in November that also required that the SEC 
adopt a rule with regard to custody. 
On December 30th, the SEC published Final Rules establishing 
custody rules, and likewise establishing an implementation schedule 
throughout the course of 2010 primarily for these rules to come into 
effect.  The SEC did not prohibit an adviser from maintaining custody of 
client assets, despite everything you’ve heard and despite some of the 
high-profile problems that have occurred, but by way of these rules it 
certainly encourages custodians to be independent of the adviser. 
Now, what’s important is that the custody requirements only apply 
to registered advisers, not unregistered advisers.  That said, if a universal 
registration regime comes into effect, it’s going to sweep many, many 
more advisers into this regime. 
First, what is “custody?”  There are existing SEC rules that define 
custody as “an adviser maintaining physical custody of client assets” 
(that’s funds and securities) or “acting in a capacity that gives it legal 
ownership to the securities,” such as a general partner of a limited 
partnership or a managing member of an LLC or likewise, depending on 
the type of juridical entity we’re talking about.  And then, the third 
attribute that can be deemed to be custody is if the adviser “has authority 
to obtain client assets by way of deducting advisory fees or writing 
checks or withdrawing funds.” 
So in the custody rules, the definition of “custody” has been 
expanded beyond what I just mentioned, in the sense that if client assets 
are held directly or indirectly by a related person in connection with the 
advisory services, that likewise is deemed to be custody and subject to 
the rules. 
The key attributes of the new rules — well, actually, I’m not going 
to go through them all, just the ones that really are important to the fund 
industry: 
• An annual surprise examination requirement — that’s to verify the 
client assets — and everybody can visualize Madoff and other situations 
coming to the fore here, that none of this really was in place — “to 
verify the client assets are held by a qualified custodian, either in a 
separate account in the name of the client or in an omnibus account held 
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for the benefit of all the clients in the name of the adviser as agent or 
trustee.” 
Now, the elements of a surprise examination — and this would be 
an annual examination — is to confirm with both the qualified custodian 
and with the client where the assets are, that the assets are being held 
appropriately, and to reconcile cash flows in and out and the various 
confirmations. 
Now, there are exceptions to the surprise examination requirement.  
Under the originally proposed amendments, all registered advisers with 
custody would be subject to an annual surprise examination.  But the 
final rules include several exceptions that are important: 
• One is an adviser deemed to have custody of assets, because of its 
authority to deduct fees from the accounts, will not be subject to the 
surprise exam requirement. 
• Secondly, an adviser that is deemed to have custody solely 
because a related person is the custodian is not subject to that surprise 
examination requirement if the custodian is “operationally independent.”  
There are definitions and guidance on what that means.  You can think 
of that in terms of the big banks, the big brokerage houses, whether 
they’re going to meet that requirement, although there are requirements 
for internal account controls certified by auditors. 
• And then lastly — and this exemption has been around for a while 
but it has now been enhanced a bit — is an adviser to a pooled 
investment vehicle, like a hedge fund, is deemed to satisfy the 
examination requirement if the pool is subject to an annual financial 
statement audit by a PCAOB-registered accountant and that those 
financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP are distributed 
to investors. 
Another important area in connection with the custody rules are 
requirements for compliance policies and procedures.  Advisers are 
required to adopt written policies and procedures reasonably designed to 
prevent violation of the Advisers Act anyway and the custody 
requirements.  Some of these are common sense that you would think 
people would do, but they refer to background checks, authorization of 
more than one person to make withdrawals, segregating duties of 
advisory personnel from custodial personnel, and for the compliance 
staff of the adviser to identify, rectify, and report in a prompt manner 
any sort of problems or violations that occur so that they can be taken 
care of on somewhat of a real-time basis. 
So last point: What’s the impact on funds of the custody in broad, 
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broad strokes? 
One is an adviser to a pooled investment vehicle would either have 
to obtain an annual financial statement audit, as I mentioned before, and 
distribute those financial statements to beneficial owners, or undergo the 
new surprise examination requirement.  If they are subject to the surprise 
examination requirement, there is also a requirement for account 
statements, which I haven’t touched upon.  It’s a detail. 
For a firm not using a PCAOB-registered accountant — and that 
would be the case for some foreign advisers, foreign pools, and foreign 
accounting firms that actually don’t have the registration — those 
advisers are going to have to transition to properly registered 
accountants or otherwise they’re going to be subject to the surprise 
examination requirement and the account statement delivery. 
For firms that have self-custody of pooled assets, because the firm 
or related person serves as the custodian, those firms will need to obtain 
the new internal control reports from a properly registered accountant. 
I think that’s all I wanted to cover. 
 
JAMES JALIL: Thank you, Holland. 
I was wondering how long we’d get before that man’s name would 
be mentioned, Madoff.  We got down to three people before somebody 
mentioned the name. 
We’ll take a small break, about ten minutes, and then we’ll come 
back for a panel discussion and questions. 
[Break: 11:05–11:26 a.m.] 
 
JAMES JALIL: Welcome back. 
For the second part of our Symposium today, I’d like to begin our 
discussion.  But I want to invite the audience to participate in the 
discussion — questions, comments, directed as you will. 
I’m going to start things off by asking this question, throw it out to 
whoever may want to answer: It seems to me that a good part of the 
rationale for legislation is tied up with the events of 2008 and 2009 and 
tied up with systemic risk and risk to the infrastructure of the capital 
markets posed by large pools of money — which, by the way, was one 
of the impetuses of the 1940 Act in the first place.  So if a rationale for 
legislation is dealing with systemic risk, does registration of advisers 
even affect that?  Does this bill even address it?  Is it efficacious in 
dealing with systemic risk?  And, on top of that, is the SEC in a position 
to deal with systemic risk — that is to say the risk to the capital markets 
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from large pools of money and the way they are managed? 
Anyone want to start that?  Paul? 
 
PAUL ROTH: Yes.  I think if you go back to 2004, the SEC passed 
a registration rule with respect to advisers to hedge funds, and that was 
before you had the systemic risk issue pop up.  I think it is based largely 
— although Buddy seems very capable speaking for himself — upon the 
fact that the size of the industry indicates that basic information 
regarding how that industry is operating and how the managers are 
operating just made sense.  I mean this is an industry, after all, that got 
its growth because the SEC proposed Section 3(c)(7) be added to the 
Investment Company Act.  Before 3(c)(7), you had maybe $500 million 
in assets, or actually less in 1995, and the growth of the industry has far 
outpaced the growth of the mutual fund industry in the period 1995 to 
2008–2009. 
So I think that there was a movement — certainly a regulatory 
impetus — to find out more about hedge funds prior to the time that you 
had the systemic risk crash. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: I’d jump in a little bit.  The Administration 
in its proposal was dealing with the issue from worrying about systemic 
risk.  Certainly, if there is going to be collection of data and sharing of 
data, the least obtrusive or intrusive manner of getting that data seemed 
to us, and I believe to the Administration, to use the existing mechanism 
inside the SEC to collect that data, to collect it from the advisers as 
opposed to trying to make the funds have that information, and to make 
it as simple as we can do that. 
We are working closely with our foreign counterparts so that 
information that we might develop is consistent with the data that 
foreign regulators may develop. 
By way of background, I don’t know what the actual number is, but 
it’s certainly north of 80 percent of all hedge fund assets and private 
fund assets are resident either in the United Kingdom or in the United 
States.  So if we don’t capture the information in the proper manner, 
we’re going to have duplications, we’re going to have the inability to be 
able to reconcile data.  So there’s a big effort that we are doing — and 
not just with the United Kingdom, but also with IOSCO, such that there 
is template-type information, so that there is standardization of the 
information so that it’s useful, and so that we actually can share it with 
each other and eliminate overreaching or double-counting and things of 
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that nature. 
I would point out that while the Administration had that view 
toward systemic risk, there has been no determination of who a systemic 
risk regulator might be.  You know, alternatively, they have talked about 
Treasury doing it. They have talked about the Fed doing it. They have 
talked about a council of regulators doing it.  I do think that developing 
the information in the right format over time and making it available will 
help that effort. 
From my perspective, we have had the growth of an industry where 
they are managing other people’s money.  That’s precisely what the 
Advisers Act is supposed to take care of.  The arguments that “we’re not 
systemically important” — you’re still managing other people’s money, 
and if you’re managing other people’s money in the securities markets, 
you should be subject to a degree of regulation. 
The “fourteen or fewer clients” has been pushed to a limit.  It’s not 
widely known to people that aren’t in the industry, but I’ll pass on a 
little bit of an insight.  There are people who are managing hedge funds 
in the United States that have an office in London and are fully 
registered with the FSA, share all their information with the FSA about 
what’s going on in the United States, and don’t talk to me.  And yet, the 
vast majority of their assets are actually located in the United States. 
 
PAUL ROTH: Do you take that personally? 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: I don’t, no.  But I just think that that’s a 
gap in our regulatory regime.  As you look at that, I do think that those 
gaps shouldn’t exist.  I think that is something that if you were designing 
your regulatory regime today you would not put in “fourteen or fewer 
clients” as a way. 
Now, you might decide that there may be certain asset classes for 
which you might make a determination that maybe the Advisers Act 
isn’t the way it should be regulated, but you wouldn’t have done it based 
on number of clients.  You might have done it based on assets, you 
might have done it on any number of things, but I doubt anybody would 
say that, that is the right way to make that kind of judgment. 
 
JAMES JALIL: But if you come in with an adviser registration 
scenario or structure, to take your point that whether you’re managing 
money in a hedge fund, a venture capital fund, or a private equity fund, 
that you’re still managing people’s money — that’s just your position — 
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but yet the Act and the policy seem to treat those asset classes 
differently.  There is more systemic risk, for example, on a hedge fund 
pool because there’s a long-short fund, or whatever, that may affect the 
market more than, say, a venture capital play. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: There’s a couple of things going on at the 
same time. 
One is, you know, registering as an adviser in the United States has 
got to be the simplest thing.  You fill out a form, you file it with us, and 
you wind up being registered.  If you’re overseas and want to be 
registered as an investment adviser, they have to decide that you are a fit 
and proper person.  They want to know how much capital you’re going 
to commit, they want to know who’s going to do this for you, you can 
only use certain approved counterparties, a whole range — they really 
are very much into all the things you’re doing.  Our regime is, for better 
or worse, a much lighter regime in that respect, so we don’t get into that. 
What I would envision, if we wound up with a regime where we are 
supposed to collect data, the data you would collect from venture capital 
funds would be significantly different from what you would do if you 
had a $10 billion hedge fund, which would be significantly different 
from if you had a $500 million hedge fund.  In other words, I think that 
the acts contemplate that the amount of information and the types of 
information we get would differ based on a number of different 
scenarios. 
And by the way, if we don’t build it that way, we are setting 
ourselves up to fail.  You talk to anybody who manages money, they 
have what I call filters, that there’s only certain information they look at, 
they can’t look at everything all the time, so you decide what you think 
is important and that’s what you look at. 
That’s some of the dialogue that we have going on with some 
foreign regulators.  The FSA has already done voluntary data gathering, 
and so we have had dialogues with them about what they got, what they 
didn’t get, and how they’d like to modify that, so we have a sense of 
what kind of data we should be getting and in what format, and then 
how do you build this. 
I suspect that the new division inside the SEC, which we call Risk 
Fin, will have a lot to do with what type of data would be very helpful. 
 
JAMES JALIL: Matt, for someone who has to put this data 
together, how would you respond to that?  Would you say, “Well, just 
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tell me what you need and I’ll give it to you”?  Is that just the end of it? 
 
MATTHEW SIANO: No. I think, like I said in the formal 
comments, we’ve had some of these examples already.  I generally agree 
— again, I want to make sure I’m very clear on this — I agree that this 
is a pretty light exercise.  In terms of the ADV, in terms of the process to 
get started, that part I agree is pretty light.  Frankly, if the idea is just to 
be able to get the government’s arms around sort of who’s out there, 
that’s perfectly fine. 
I do think as you drill down on the specifics of what it is that you 
want — not you — but when you’re saying, “Mr. Regulator, you want 
something; what is it that you want and how do we go about doing 
that?” — I agree with you, it’s fraught with not only difficulty in terms 
of manpower, but also, even if I wanted to comply to the absolute best of 
my ability, I’m going to be worried about things like what kind of 
disclaimers do I have to put on it, how do I define each of these terms, 
what do you want in, what do you want out.  That’s the part that I think 
has to — 
 
JAMES JALIL: In the end, liability that you’ve never had.  All of a 
sudden, here’s a form.  An analogy is I think that the industry suffered a 
little bit on the short sale forms; it was a little bit of a nightmare. 
 
MATTHEW SIANO: Absolutely, absolutely. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: My Division didn’t do those. 
 
MATTHEW SIANO: Absolutely not.  But you’re absolutely right. 
 
JAMES JALIL: Okay.  Then that was a terrible nightmare. 
 
MATTHEW SIANO: We hired someone on a temporary basis just 
to address Form SH. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: I mean I would say if we do this we need 
to do it right.  People are going to be relying on us getting the right 
information, getting it in a format that people can manipulate and do 
what needs to be done, and not get so much data that in fact we can’t use 
it. 
I’ll tell you that there is concern at the SEC that the more data we 
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have, we have to use it.  If you look at just the potential for the SEC as 
an agency to have a lot of data and not to use it appropriately, it is 
potentially a huge risk for the agency.  So I think there will be a desire to 
make sure we get the right data, that we don’t get too much data. 
 
MATTHEW SIANO: It’s interesting.  I think the regulator and the 
industry suffer almost from the same problem, which is this 
misperception both in dealing with the press and dealing with one 
another.  I think a lot of the angst and a lot of the palaver you hear from 
people about the registration would go away if that statement that you 
made was more widely disseminated, that there’s at least an 
understanding, there’s a recognition, that this is not something that we 
are going to do in a scattershot fashion or in a willy-nilly fashion, and 
we’re going to really work to make sure that the data is right.  I think 
that would drain a lot of the strain out of people. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: In any organization there’s some people 
that want everything they can ever get, and there’s people like myself 
who look at this and say, “No.  I want to be able to focus on what I think 
is the important information, stuff that is informative, that helps me 
make some judgments, as opposed to trying to get everything.”  Then, in 
a sense, it’s like somebody putting you inside the New York Public 
Library and saying, “Everything is here, go look at it.  By the way, there 
is no catalogue system for you.” 
 
PAUL ROTH: Just for a moment, Buddy, the registration process, I 
would agree with you that it’s not that difficult to register.  But the 
consequences of registering are what you’re not addressing.  The 
consequence of registering is the examination process, and that is 
something that I think it’s fair to say a number of people find to be 
extremely difficult. 
We’ve had clients where examiners have set up shop for nine 
months.  You get a feeling that they’re not leaving until they find 
something that they can report and give a demerit on the report card. 
So if your approach with respect to the kinds of information that 
you would like to see, that it be tailored, could be carried over to the 
examination process, and that is more tailored to control issues and 
making sure that fraud is what they are looking for rather than 
violations, I think that there would be a much greater sympathy in the 
hedge fund world, in the investment advisers world, in the regulated 
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world, to say, “Yes, we are on the same page.” 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: And, Paul, I would point out I spent 30 
years of my life on the other side, so I have an appreciation for what it’s 
like.  I was always at a big firm, so I used to see the examiners once a 
year, minimum.  So I do appreciate that concern. 
I would say that I think the Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations has probably the most difficult job inside the 
Commission.  I don’t mean to criticize them or anything, but it is a 
difficult position that they have.  There is a new head for that who has 
recently started.  I think it will be interesting to see how he reshapes that 
program. 
You know, one of the criticisms — and I’m not saying that this is 
valid or not — is that they are not focusing on big stuff; they’re focusing 
on little things, and if you focus on the big things you’re going to be in 
and out of firms a lot faster, and in fact you can then cover more of the 
industry, which has been one of the criticisms, that we don’t cover 
enough of the industry. 
 
JAMES JALIL: Professor, I think you might have a different take 
on this.  What would you say if someone made the suggestion that this is 
a slippery slope; that we start with this benign registration of investment 
advisers, a simple ADV form, from which they want to collect certain 
information?  Is this now the thread that pulls out the entire string and 
you get into ultimately regulation of hedge funds, which has not been 
the case in the past? 
 
J.W. VERRET: Yes.  I would point to the ‘33 and the ‘34 Acts, 
disclosure rules that are now affirmative prescriptive rules.  The gun-
jumping rules I think were the sort of thing that Congress did not have in 
mind in 1933 and 1934.  So I think yes, that is evidence of a natural 
tendency for regulation to grow. 
But I go back to the original purpose of what’s the SEC doing.  Is it 
systemic risk?  Is it protection of investors from fraud?  If it is investor 
protection from fraud, remember these are very sophisticated investors 
in this world.  I suspect — I’m sure Paul has read thousands of these 
operative documents, the underlying business entities of these funds — 
but I suspect they probably tend to take advantage of the right under 
state corporate law and under LLC and LLP law to opt out of fiduciary 
duties.  I suspect there is probably some significant fiduciary opt-out in 
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some of those operative documents, and I suspect they probably 
represent an affirmative decision by the investors that maybe the cost of 
fiduciary duty suits isn’t worth it and that market discipline is good 
enough.  So why would we want to interfere with that decision? 
And if it’s about systemic risk, I still have yet to hear an accurate 
and complete definition of systemic risk.  In fact, what I hear is a term 
sort of thrown around to justify action without any sort of really 
descriptive power and force. 
I think systemic risk is something that initially developed in the 
context of banking panics.  I think depositor insurance and the Treasury 
standing behind the FDIC largely protects us from systemic risk issues.  
If we define it as some large banks or some large institutions fail, 
billions of dollars are lost, but the rest of the system eventually comes 
back in a couple of years, that’s part of the natural creative destruction 
of capitalism to me.  I think that’s a natural process of capitalism.  Why 
would we want to interfere with that? 
So I still don’t think we are working from a good working 
definition of systemic risk, if that’s our primary motivation. 
 
PAUL ROTH: If I may just respond to your question, I think (1) 
from a legal standpoint, from a regulatory standpoint, a fraud standpoint 
let’s say, state law and federal law, I don’t believe you can contract 
yourself out of fiduciary duty. 
 
J.W. VERRET: In LLCs absolutely. 
 
PAUL ROTH: Well, no.  What you see is a discussion with 
sophisticated investors as to whether or not you are held to a negligence 
or a gross negligence standard.  It’s an interesting question as to whether 
being a fiduciary is consistent with a negligence standard or consistent 
with a gross negligence standard.  But that is a matter of contract that 
does get dealt with, I agree with you. 
However, I’m reminded of what Alan Greenspan said, because he 
might echo some of the things that you have said here today, except that 
there’s one thing that he has commented on with respect to the credit 
crisis and the crisis in the markets in 2007 and 2008, and that was the 
underlying premise of self-regulation is that institutions will not destroy 
themselves, that they will regulate themselves inherently without 
destroying themselves, that there is an inhibitor in terms of conduct that 
prevents them from killing themselves. 
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It turned out that inhibitor didn’t work.  I think that’s why many of 
us are seeing the pendulum perhaps swing further than we’d like it to 
swing.  But it’s a natural part of the nature of regulation.  It had gotten to 
the point where we were relying on institutions, boards of directors, 
management, to make sure that they did not destroy themselves, then 
suddenly we found out that they did such basic things as invest for the 
long term and borrow on the short term.  You don’t need to be an 
economic genius to know that long term is not a sustainable model.  But 
the major corporations in this world did it. 
In the absence of there being an exercise of self-restraint, I think 
you see a regulatory sort of compulsion to jump in and fill the vacuum.  
Will it go too far and do the bills go too far in some respects?  I don’t 
think there’s any argument that they will and they do, and it will be 
carved back over time. 
But, living through what we have lived through, to argue that self-
restraint works, one might say the history of the last two years indicated 
it didn’t. 
 
J.W. VERRET: I would just respond to that by, first, just 
differentiating between self-restraint and self-regulation.  By self-
regulation I mean something much more formal than simple self-
restraint.  But even more than that, I think the overwhelming use of the 
words “systemic risk” as the bogeyman for regulation and for subsidy 
and for bailout is part of the reason why we didn’t see enough self-
restraint.  So I think as we information-gather, as we say “here’s a 
systemic risk issue,” I think we’ll see that information being used to 
promote further bailouts on the Federal Reserve side, and I think we’ll 
continue to see that limiting the exercise of self-restraint in the long 
term. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: The concerns that you have I would say 
are way above my pay grade. 
 
J.W. VERRET: Above mine too, probably. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: I do agree, I haven’t seen a great definition 
of what systemic risk is.  What you hear from some people is, “We 
know it when we see it,” yet I’m not sure that’s true either. 
But as I think of it — you talk about what is the role of the SEC.  
The SEC’s role is primarily as really the investor advocate and 
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protecting investors, but we also have primary responsibility for fair and 
orderly markets and capital formation.  So there are other things that we 
are responsible for. 
To go back to why I think that some of the proposals with respect to 
registration of investment advisers make sense for hedge funds, it goes 
to filling gaps that I don’t think make sense to be there.  It’s a 
mechanism; if one wants to get the data with respect to hedge funds in 
that area, that is the least intrusive way to get that.  I thought that was a 
moderate means of trying to wind up getting that information in a format 
that people could wind up using it.  So as I’ve thought about different 
approaches one could take, it seemed like that was the least intrusive 
means of getting that information. 
There was a comment before, that the bills said that the documents 
and information we’re requiring with respect to the funds is owned by 
the adviser.  The reason is that we have to make sure we have access to 
that information.  We don’t have access if somebody says to us, “Well, 
it’s not me.  I’m just the general partner.  It belongs to the limited 
partnership and you can’t have it because you have no jurisdiction.”  So 
there were some aspects that we then had to deal with in order to make 
sure that if in fact that was the approach that was taken, that there wasn’t 
the possibility that people could use roadblocks to what we needed to 
achieve. 
So as I think of it, we were just in many ways trying to do what I 
thought was a sensible approach.  Is there always the possibility that you 
wind up being much more intrusive?  Yes. 
I think the one thing about the SEC that keeps us from being overly 
aggressive at times is our own structure, which at the Commission level 
— you know, we are an independent agency, so we have two 
Republicans, two Democrats, and a Chairman.  You can’t get anything 
done unless you can get at least three people to vote for it.  That is a 
restraint on us.  It doesn’t mean the pendulum won’t swing, but it is a 
governor on the pendulum maybe not swinging too far, and it does lead 
to some consensus decision-making, and I think that’s a good process. 
 
JAMES JALIL: I think we have a question here. 
 
QUESTION: It has been very interesting hearing what you 
gentlemen have been talking about, the regulation as it is written today.  
I’d ask, even in the broadest strokes, if you could talk about the current 
theme that many of you brought up, which is: What is intelligent 
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regulation; what should it look like; should it include fraud; should it 
include systemic risk; should it be geared toward the investors?  I’d like 
to hear your viewpoints as to if you had your druthers what should this 
look like, besides just the simple KISS principle of being able to read it 
without going through 2,000 pages of documents.  Thank you. 
 
JAMES JALIL: Well, I think 2,000 pages of documents is very 
good for lawyers. 
I’ll start that off, but I want almost everyone to comment on that.  
It’s a great question and very insightful. 
I think it’s fair to say that the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
which is the starting point for all of this, really had two primary goals in 
mind: (1) the protection of the investor against fraud and (2) the 
protection against systemic risk from the capital markets. 
This is not a new concept.  If you look at the history of the stock 
market in 1929 and the congressional hearings in the early 1930s, one of 
the reasons for the instability of the market were these capital pools, 
which were highly leveraged and so forth. 
If you look at the 1940 Act, when it deals with registered mutual 
funds, there are a lot of inherent systemic risk inhibitors right there.  So 
this is nothing we just thought up in 2009. 
So what is the proper regulation?  I’ll go down the panel.  I think 
it’s a great question. 
What do you think, Buddy? 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: I start off if you look at the Advisers Act, 
you can’t do fraud.  You have to make sure that people out there are 
dealing honestly and fairly with their clients — first and foremost 
protection of that. 
And I think you go to the integrity of the markets.  What has made 
America great in terms of a securities market is the integrity of our 
markets.  That goes to a whole range of issues that go to how the 
exchanges operate, how the over-the-counter market operates, making 
sure that, in fact, that is fair. 
I think you almost always wind up starting off with the investor, but 
I also think that you have to always bear in mind that our markets aren’t 
going to work well if in fact they don’t help facilitate capital formation.  
Part of that is an active secondary market. 
So as I think of securities regulation, to the extent that we affect any 
one of those things that I’ve just said, I think we have to be very careful, 
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because it is going to have some consequences. 
But I do think that investor confidence is incredibly important.  
Keeping people from committing fraud is paramount. 
 
MATTHEW SIANO: I’d say, use the analogy that you need healthy 
animals in an environment and you need a healthy environment.  So all 
the things that you’re talking about — you need the players to be 
healthy, you need the places where they play to be healthy, and you need 
prosecution. 
I think the part that keeps people in line — I guess this is the 
fundamental disagreement I have with the Professor — I think 
enforcement is the only thing that really ultimately keeps people in line.  
Putting a seventy-three-year-old man in jail for 150 years isn’t really 
what gets people to actually behave.  What gets people to behave is if 
you put someone who’s my age in jail for forty years.  That’s the 
fundamental issue that I think is really important here. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: I would point out that somebody who is 
going to engage in that kind of theft is not going to care what my 
regulations are. 
 
MATTHEW SIANO: I agree that if you’re a sociopath that doesn’t 
change anything. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: No, no, because he’s going to jail.  I mean 
the criminal law is going to get him.  The fact that I can kick him out of 
the advisory business is not going to. 
 
MATTHEW SIANO: But I think the important point is that I would 
argue that the individual that we keep talking about, this Madoff 
individual, who sort of floats over everything we talk about, is not the 
classic way that fraud really starts out, in the sense that it’s little 
decisions.  People make little bad decisions — “How do I value an 
illiquid investment?”  You know, we talk about valuation, why it’s 
difficult.  If it’s just a publicly traded U.S. equity, that’s one thing — 
you just go and get your Bloomberg number, it is what it is.  But there 
are a lot of little decisions that people start to make.  They start to 
convince themselves that this is okay.  The next thing you know, you’re 
on to the next thing, on to the next thing, on to the next thing. 
To me the only thing that effectively gets people who come to that 
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sort of fork in the road — the CCO who’s trying to do that, the GC 
who’s trying to do that — “No, no, no, wait a minute.  What did we tell 
investors about how we’re going to do this?  Are we a fiduciary first?”  
Unless I have the ability to point to and say, and somebody else is going 
to come and back me up and tell me, “Yes, this is right,” it’s very 
difficult on the ground to be able to get people to do those things. 
 
J.W. VERRET: If I could just come in real quick, I would define 
good regulation as regulation subject to sincere cost-benefit analysis.  So 
I would say one of the challenges I think, and I fashion myself a critic of 
the Commission — it’s like a movie critic; you love movies, you love to 
watch them, you love to learn about them, but at the same time you try 
to keep them honest. 
One of the challenges I see as I read these proposed rules is you get 
to the cost section and, frankly, it’s something of a joke.  It makes some 
lowball estimate of compliance costs.  It says nothing about opportunity 
costs.  It says nothing about cost to liquidity, capital formation.  It says 
nothing about the cost of trades not undertaken, the deadweight losses 
— the harbinger triangles in the economic-speak — of efficient trades 
broadly defined, not just trades of securities, but trades not taken that 
would be taken otherwise but for the regulation. You see no sincere 
estimate of that. 
Internalization of cost is, I think, the advantage to the properly 
designed self-regulatory organization, more internalization of cost than 
you see at the Commission side. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: I can’t let that go without a little 
counterpoint on that. 
Cost-benefit analysis is a challenge, and it’s a big challenge in 
securities regulation. 
I would first point out that typically when one engages in cost-
benefit, the costs and the benefits are to the same parties.  In securities 
regulation they are not.  So you have to be careful. 
Now, we have to do cost-benefit analysis for many of the rules that 
we do.  I’m not saying that we shouldn’t have to, but I think there should 
be a recognition that if I’m protecting somebody from robbing money 
from my mother, the fact that it might cost $100 to keep them from 
stealing $99 from my mother doesn’t mean that I shouldn’t spend the 
$100 to keep them from stealing the money from my mother.  That’s 
kind of lost in the debate about cost-benefit analysis. 
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The other thing about cost-benefit analysis is frequently you don’t 
know what the behavior is then going to be.  So it’s very much 
behavioral-type economics in terms of if you do this what are all the 
different things. 
When we come out with proposals, one of the things that we ask 
everybody to help us with is to give us the information on it, and nobody 
does.  Then the criticism is, “You guys didn’t do a very good cost-
benefit analysis.” 
Frequently, we don’t know how the industry is going to react to 
something — what changes they might make, what solutions they may 
have to the problems that we’ve pointed out.  But if the industry and the 
critics aren’t helpful in terms of coming forward with data for us or 
approaches that we could take on doing a better cost-benefit analysis, 
then I think we all lose.  That’s my theme. 
I’m not saying we can’t do a better job on cost-benefit analysis.  I 
will tell you if you look at any of our releases, what’s referred to as the 
“back end,” which is all the cost-benefit analysis, I will tell you it takes 
up half the release.  I will tell you that in the current Commission we 
have a whole new division, that is Risk Fin, and it’s essentially all non-
lawyers.  The goal is to have people in that have the background, that 
have the experience, that can help us do a better job on that. 
I’m not saying we get it right all the time, but I am saying that there 
are real challenges.  I think it’s really important to do. 
But I also think that you need to recognize the limitations on a cost-
benefit-type analysis.  Clearly, we could eradicate fraud.  We’d probably 
kill all the markets.  So there is kind of an optimization of things. 
 
JAMES JALIL: It’s funny.  I remember that when cost-benefit 
analysis started, it was meant to streamline things and make the 
Commission think about cost-benefit analysis.  I think it’s ironic that — 
and I know this to be the case — half the release is on the cost-benefit 
analysis.  So you wonder, what is the cost-benefit to cost-benefit. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: And by the way, when anybody doesn’t 
like what we are doing, they say, “Well, obviously you didn’t do a cost-
benefit analysis, so we’ll take you to court.” 
 
JAMES JALIL: I think there’s a question over here. 
 
QUESTION: I’m the CCO of a hedge fund here in New York City.  
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We are not registered, although we do operate as if we were registered, 
we have the same policies and procedures, which I think is the case for 
most non-registered funds that manage any substantial amount of 
money. 
It seems that every time we start talking about hedge fund 
registration we go back to Madoff.  Aside from systemic risk being the 
driver for hedge fund registration, we talk about fraud, and then when 
we talk about fraud we talk about Madoff.  However, Madoff was not a 
hedge fund and Madoff was a registered entity. 
So my concern is: How is this new registration of hedge funds 
going to protect the investor from fraud if it follows the same precedent 
that was set by the current registration that is in place for registered 
investment advisers?  It didn’t work in the case of Madoff, so why will it 
work in terms of the hedge funds? 
 
JAMES JALIL: That’s great, and I’ll ask everybody to answer that 
question. 
But I just would point out for the record that Long-Term Capital out 
of Greenwich was not a fraud, and that had a serious deleterious effect 
on the market.  There was no fraud there at all.  But your point is well 
taken. 
Buddy? 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: I don’t think you’ve heard me mention the 
need for registration as being driven by Madoff.  To me there’s a 
regulatory gap that I think, with respect to registration of people 
managing other people’s money, is one that I think needs filling. 
I’m not up here to try and defend the fact that the Commission 
didn’t catch Madoff.  Madoff was both a broker-dealer and an adviser.  
He only was a registered adviser at the very end of his tenure.  He 
basically was probably lying about everything he did.  Some people at 
the Commission kid — I don’t mean actually kidding — that he could 
have been running a cleaner.  He was just taking people’s money and 
telling them he was doing things with it.  So I separate that. 
I think we certainly need to do a better job on things like Madoff.  I 
had the distinct pleasure, or displeasure, depending on how you look at 
it, of having to go and testify before Congress about that.  That 
testimony wasn’t me speaking; it was people speaking to me, sometimes 
on volume. 
I think we need to do a better job there.  People should rely on us 
2011] THE REGULATION OF INVESTMENT FUNDS 61 
being able to do that. 
 
JAMES JALIL: There’s another question here. 
 
QUESTION: Matthew Siano, I really share your philosophy on the 
credible threat.  My firm deals with pre-launch hedge funds and we set 
up the policies and procedures and investor relations regime.  I 
constantly am using the antifraud provisions as a reason why they 
should be taking actions, and it’s really very, very useful. 
My question really revolves around a couple of things.  I see the 
SEC in my role especially useful as a credible threat.  I have been an 
auditor in the past of financial institutions.  The auditors will all tell you 
that they cannot detect fraud.  Their sampling process cannot.  So I feel 
like the SEC’s reputation has been blemished by the perception that they 
could detect fraud and the inability to do it, but yet you’re still using a 
filtering process. 
My first question is: How is your filtering process of sampling data 
better than the auditor’s? — and in some cases it’s not hard to be better 
than the auditors in the Madoff case and in the Bayou case. 
And then, secondly, my worry is that I have never seen an 
environment where investors are more diligent than in their approach to 
picking hedge funds.  So the administrative choices and the auditing — 
the investors really know.  They’ve gotten the message right now.  If we 
move to registration, will they take a false sense of confidence, and what 
will be the SEC’s messaging around making sure — “Oh, now this 
under-the-radar, unregulated hedge fund industry is now registered.  So 
we can put our guard down” — Is there anything that you are doing to 
help with that? 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: I’ll start off and then Paul can probably 
say where I’m wrong on things. 
One of the approaches that the Chairman has challenged all of us to 
cinsider is, what can we do to get as many sets of eyes as we can so that 
things are discovered, things are reported, and we catch things early. 
What kind of techniques can we use?  One of the things is the 
custody rule that was spoken about before.  Part of that is we want to 
make sure not just that there are eyes on it, but that the eyes are from 
people that have a sufficient degree of stature, being PCAOB-registered 
and inspected entities.  That was not something that, by way of example, 
existed with Madoff.  So on custody, how do we find that out? 
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We also look at some techniques in terms of — in one case, maybe 
you could say, “Okay, for certain types of funds who are the auditors?”  
So if you had a problem with a particular fund who used a particular 
auditor and you have that database, you would then know who the 
auditors were.  You might want to go check other similar kinds.  You 
might have a higher degree of comfort based on who some of the service 
providers were. 
You might look at particular return characteristics that might exist 
inside certain types of pooled vehicles and say, “What is the likelihood 
that this return characteristic could be delivered over the period of time 
that people said?”  It used to be the outliers were the ones that were 
performing extraordinarily well.  Madoff was one that was performing 
extraordinarily consistently. 
I think we are all trying to come up with the right techniques to take 
the data and sort through it.  We’re not going to be really good, we’re 
not going to catch all those, but we are bringing in people with different 
types of expertises.  One of the criticisms before was we were all 
lawyers.  One of the things that the Chairman has made a real effort at is 
to get people in who do have the industry experience, people who are 
not lawyers, people who are economists, people who are risk people, and 
bring them in and use that expertise to help us do this better. 
But we’re not going to catch everything, and we recognize that.  
The thing is: How can we catch things earlier? 
The Chairman has been quite vocal about the fact we really would 
like the opportunity to reward people who come in and turn in others, 
kind of like the approach that has been taken and that has been 
successful with the IRS, so that there is an incentive for people to, in 
effect, turn in organizations that aren’t doing the things that they should 
do. 
 
JAMES JALIL: Just to answer that, I want to add — not to defend 
the SEC, but it’s curious to me that the investors and the press who 
criticized the Madoff situation — “How could you not have caught it?” 
— to pick up on a point you made about due diligence being done today, 
if you look back and look at the red flags, it looked like May Day in 
Moscow.  There were more red flags you could see floating in the air. 
 
QUESTIONER: I have to disagree.  You know, $12 billion of very 
sophisticated investors didn’t find it.  It’s easier now because it’s easier 
to find something with hindsight. 
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PARTICIPANT: I would question whether they were really 
sophisticated, because a lot of people got burned in that.  I would qualify 
them as not being very sophisticated because they were getting burned.  
I have an issue with how you define that. 
 
PAUL ROTH: I think in some ways the three of you are asking the 
same question in different ways.  One can argue you don’t need a law to 
tell people that they’re not supposed to take a gun and rob a bank.  The 
fact that you do have a law that tells people you’re not supposed to take 
a gun and rob a bank doesn’t stop some people from taking a gun and 
robbing a bank. 
When you talk about how regulation works, regulation will never 
dissuade certain people from antisocial behavior or self-enrichment 
behavior, or however they see it. 
The one thing I remember from criminal class in law school — and 
that was a long time ago — was a professor saying, “Don’t ever make 
the mistake of thinking that you understand the way a criminal thinks.  
The mere fact that you are not breaking the law indicates you do not 
understand how that person thinks.” 
[Laughter] 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: And you raised your hand and said, “No, I 
do understand,” and then became a lawyer. 
[Laughter] 
 
PAUL ROTH: Now you see what a regulator says. 
So I think what we are all trying to do is to recognize that bad 
actors will be bad actors probably no matter what we do.  But they are 
on the outer fringe.  Thankfully, there is an outer fringe of those people. 
Now what we are dealing with is: How do we structure regulation 
so that it encourages best practices, it doesn’t overly impact markets in 
ways that markets shouldn’t be impacted and let markets operate in 
ways that markets should be allowed to operate? 
There are very good questions about sophisticated investors.  For 
example, one position I have is: does it make really any sense to have 
Form ADV that you use for a retail investor be the same Form ADV and 
the same information that you are giving to people who are investing in 
hedge funds, who have much more sophistication, and who have what 
we call DDQs, due diligence questionnaires that are this thick that they 
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give to the investment manager to fill out prior to the time in which they 
invest? 
On the other hand, there are ways to encourage best practices.  The 
law can do that and maybe should be doing that. 
I think one of the ways to do that is you need to have a certain 
amount of information as to what’s going on in order to be able to 
operate intelligently.  I think that is what the registration provisions as it 
relates to hedge funds are trying to do.  I think there are gaps right now, 
and I think Buddy is correct that we would like to fill those gaps — or 
he’d like to fill them.  If I have any clients here listening, they might 
shoot me for saying we’d like to fill them. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: You told me all your clients were 
registered. 
 
PAUL ROTH: I never said that. 
What I did say is that today you’ve got 1,700 fund managers who 
are registered.  It definitely shows you that it can be done, that you can 
live side by side. 
The issue is: Where do you draw the lines?  They are difficult 
issues.  As long as you conduct the conversation intelligently with each 
other, saying, “Look, this causes me a problem because if you put this 
rule in I’ve got to have X number of people working like I did on Form 
SH over the weekend.  Unless it gives you an enormous amount of 
information that is incredibly important to the regulation of the markets, 
you shouldn’t be making me do this.  In addition to which, while I can 
afford to do it, you’re inhibiting other people from coming into the space 
because the cost of this regulation is in fact an inhibitor to new 
competition coming into the market because people who are coming into 
the market can’t afford it.” 
I think that’s basically what we are trying to do.  We are trying to 
find a balance.  Anytime you are trying to find a balance, it’s kind of 
like getting on a scale and trying to weigh yourself — you’re never 
exactly happy as to where you are, but you’re constantly striving to get 
to where you want to be. 
 
JAMES JALIL: I’m never happy. 
Holland, let me ask you. 
 
HOLLAND WEST: I agree with everything that Paul said.  I also 
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agree that many of these questions really have a common theme. 
I brought up Madoff, I think, in the context of custody.  As Paul 
says — and I don’t want to repeat everything because I have a couple of 
other points I want to make — fraud has not been a big thing in this 
business, it really hasn’t.  As you pointed out, Madoff was not a hedge 
fund, Madoff was an investment adviser, but this was basically — we 
talked about this last night — a broker-dealer fraud, a custody fraud.  
Yes, they were investment advisers. 
Now, I don’t want to argue about those differentiations, but at the 
end of the day people were receiving brokerage statements and listing 
their assets and the broker-dealer was the putative custodian.  People 
said Enron was a hedge fund. 
What I want to get to, is trying to answer the question.  Although I 
said I wasn’t an apologist for the business, the hedge fund business — 
and we’re focused on that today, and, believe me, there are far bigger 
issues that need to be dealt with in financial services reform than the 
registration of investment advisers.  In fact, I think it’s probably one of 
the least controversial things. 
The industry is painted unfairly in the press and throughout, and I 
think that’s unfortunate.  Everything becomes a hedge fund issue, 
everything becomes a hedge fund fraud, and that’s just unfair. 
What I would say is that the sensible regulation — which was your 
point, what is intelligent regulation — is, as Paul just said, gathering 
information and trying to instill best practices based on that kind of 
information and the way the markets work and to come up with a 
balance that is fair and reasonable to the people having to do this but 
also is not detrimental to innovation and growth of the markets. 
If you look at this business — and this is my other point about the 
hedge fund business — on a relative basis, or even on an absolute basis, 
this industry did very well during this last couple of years.  (1) There 
was no expectation of a safety net by the government; and (2) there was 
voluntary and some nonvoluntary deleveraging and private solutions, 
many of which were controversial, which are now the subject of best 
practices on how hedge fund private solutions will be dealt with going 
forward. 
But what I would say — and this goes back to your point about 
systemic risk — is I don’t know what systemic risk is.  I’ve read plenty 
about the German banking crises and the Herstatt risk and those sorts of 
things.  In 1998 people were throwing around the term “systemic risk” 
when Long-Term Capital — which had $4 billion, which is very small.  
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Of course, it was leveraged twenty-five times.  But nevertheless, I don’t 
know what systemic risk is. 
But what I do know, and what we have witnessed, is the 
interconnectedness of the markets in today’s world and the financial 
participants.  It is a scary thing to get so close to the precipice when 
people are not restraining themselves and there is not the discipline in 
place. 
So to me I don’t think we are necessarily — I don’t agree with 
everything that is in these bills or in any other proposals, but I think we 
are going in the right direction on gathering information and trying to 
enforce a discipline that will hopefully mean that this industry, which is 
very important, will adopt best practices and will keep doing what it 
needs to do. 
 
JAMES JALIL: I would like to pick up on a point which was 
touched on before, which is barrier to entry, and whether the unintended 
consequence of further regulation — though I take the point that ADV is 
not difficult to fill out; I appreciate that — but as the perception is that 
you will be visited by the SEC, you will have to have a compliance 
manual, you will have to have lawyers, and you will have to have certain 
accountants who have to be of a certain registration before they can even 
be your accountant — when an entrepreneur looks at all that, does he 
say, “I’d rather open up a hot dog stand or go do something else because 
there’s too high a barrier of entry”?  And will the unintended 
consequence of further registration and regulation be a consolidation of 
the industry and a disincentive to the young man or woman with a dollar 
and a dream to open up a fund? 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: There are a couple of ways I would 
answer that. 
One of the things I had mentioned before is that 69 percent of the 
advisers that are registered with us have ten or fewer employees.  So I 
do not think the current state of affairs would indicate that it has been a 
barrier to entry.  And there are 14,000 advisers that are registered with 
the states that do not even meet the criteria of having $25 million of 
assets under management.  So I think in terms of barriers to entry there 
are no capital requirements, there are no bonding requirements, there are 
no licensing rule requirements, except with respect to some state 
licensing. 
So I think, if anything, there are maybe too little barriers to entry 
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into the business of managing other people’s money.  I think as you 
compare our regime versus regimes that exist elsewhere in the world — 
you know, others look at our regime and say, “My God, how can you 
have a regime that operates like this?”  I point out to them that we have 
$40 trillion that operates under this and does quite well. 
But I’m mindful of that point.  I am just saying I don’t think we are 
there yet.  I don’t think it has reached that point.  I don’t think we ask 
that much. 
 
J.W. VERRET: Is it because it is voluntary now?  Right now if a 
fund does not like how things might change going forward, they can 
maybe get out.  But as registration becomes mandatory, then they are 
sort of stuck, right, if somebody replaces you who is not as well 
considered as you are? 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: I mean historically, when I was talking 
about the adviser regime — and forget about whether you are managing 
a hedge fund or you are just managing clients’ money.  You know, 69 
percent have ten or fewer employees and function quite well in our 
regime. 
So whether you are managing a pool of money or you are managing 
individual clients’ money, it has not seemed to be a barrier to entry at 
this point for people getting into the business.  We have not heard that it 
is a barrier to entry in that regard. 
You know, clearly, if we imposed significantly different 
requirements, at some point it does become a barrier to entry.  But it is 
almost like opening up a Kool-Aid stand at times, because there are no 
educational requirements, there are no licensing requirements, there are 
no minimum capital requirements.  You have to file an ADV with us and 
you have to make sure you aren’t a convicted felon. 
 
PAUL ROTH: You don’t have a chief compliance officer at a Kool-
Aid stand, do you?  Maybe you go to one that does.  I don’t know. 
Look, I think in broad strokes you are right. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: So it’s really to have somebody who is 
actually responsible for making sure that the firm is complying with all 
the federal securities laws. 
 
PAUL ROTH: It sounds like motherhood and apple pie.  It is just 
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not as easy as that.  That’s all I’m saying.  You make it sound that way, 
only you were driven back into the government from doing that. 
I think your statistics about 69 percent of advisers have ten or fewer 
employees are impressive.  On the other hand, the rules are changing.  
By and large, I think the market takes care of itself because for most 
hedge fund advisers, long-short equity people — that’s the largest group 
of hedge fund managers, long-short equity — valuation for those people 
is not a terribly complex problem because you can look at the last trade 
on a consolidated table for that day and you get a valuation. 
If you are going to be doing more exotic strategies, you need to 
have an infrastructure that you have to build.  What we are seeing right 
now is that funds that are starting with the desire to build these different 
strategies, which are generally in the fixed-income area — well, when 
they could start with $1 billion, they could afford the infrastructure that 
was necessary to meet all of the requirements.  The realities of today’s 
market are they cannot start with $1 billion, so they are starting with a 
couple hundred million or they are starting with 30 — I mean I talked to 
the prime brokers the other day and they are saying: “With the same 
strategy, same pedigree of a manager, that five years ago I could raise $1 
billion, $2 billion, $3 billion to start; today is starting with $30 million 
— if we can get it, maybe $50 million.”  There is where their barriers to 
entry are coming, because they cannot afford it.  That’s a tough 
question. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: That is not regulation.  That is the market 
that is regulation. 
 
PAUL ROTH: That is the market, but it is the market combined 
with the regulatory environment. 
My own view is: You know what?  If you haven’t got enough 
capital to build the infrastructure that you need to build to run the 
business the way you should run the business, you can’t be in that 
business.  That is probably not regulatory, although people look at it as 
regulatory.  It is operational. 
What most investors are looking at as the key, number one point is: 
Do you have the operational structure to run your business? 
As I said earlier, they do not look at whether you are registered or 
not as the most important issue.  They want to know whether — my 
view is the way you run your business starts at the top, and if the person 
at the top has a view that you are going to run your business in the right 
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way, whether you are registered or not, you are probably going to run 
your business very close to the same way this gentleman spoke about it. 
That does not mean that we should not have any regulation because 
the fact that we do have regulation informs the way those people who 
care about things do run their businesses, and you can’t get away from 
it. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: Paul, do you think of it differently in the 
3(c)(1) context from the 3(c)(7) context?  You know, if it is 100 or fewer 
investors, they do not have to be widely sophisticated investors that have 
bargaining power to get things that they may want to get.  Do you think 
the market disciplines are different and the dynamics are different in 
those two markets? 
 
PAUL ROTH: Yes, I do. 
You know, it’s interesting.  Holland talked earlier about whether 
venture capital funds and private equity funds should be required to 
register.  My own belief is they face many of the same conflict-of-
interest issues and they act as fiduciaries as hedge fund managers do.  
There is much more in the way of side letters, let’s say.  Side letters 
came into the hedge fund world from the venture capital and the private 
equity worlds.  The purpose of those side letters was for investors to get 
a benefit that was not being offered to other investors, whether it be that 
they were allowed to co-invest along with the fund, did they get 
preferential co-investment opportunities. 
So I think valuation issues are clearly very, very important with 
respect to these kinds of funds.  My own personal view is toward a 
registration process where the information is there and they are subject 
to certain rules, but should not be following all the rules necessarily or 
filing all the same things that a market-oriented company is.  
That is why I like the fact that there is a lot of emphasis in the 
House bill upon the Commission’s ability to classify and differentiate 
among registrants and to get different information from those registrants.  
That has not been what they have done in the past.  I hope that path will 
be one that they follow on a going-forward basis because I think that is 
better registration.  It is more intelligent registration and it is more cost-
effective registration. 
 
JAMES JALIL: Given that, and given some of the remarks that you 
had earlier, Buddy, sort of an odd re-thinking, does it make any sense to 
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have the bifurcation anymore between state regulation and SEC 
regulation?  Has that train left the station?  If it is true that 67 percent are 
ten or less, and if it is true — I don’t mean if it is true, but assuming it is 
true — that the barrier to entry is not high, and if it is true that it is only 
really the compliance officers who want to do it in the first place, then 
why have this bifurcated system?  What benefit does it have?  And, if it 
is true that you want to centralize the information to make some cogent 
analysis of it, why should it all be centrally located?  Why continue this 
bifurcation? 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: I am not here to defend the decisions that 
were made in ISMA to cut back.  I do think that was a compromise that 
was reached for any number of reasons.  Depending on your perspective 
when you are looking at it, you can have different outcomes from that. 
The sense of moving the threshold from the $25 million or $30 
million up to $100 million — by the way, the SEC could do that today if 
we decided to; ISMA gave us the ability to do that — the reluctance 
from my perspective of doing that related to whether or not I would be 
taking a problem and just moving it, as opposed to just saying, “We 
don’t have the resources to take care of this.  Let’s give it to the states.”  
The states themselves are strapped.  That probably is 4,000 of our 
11,000 — that’s a guess on my part — that would then wind up moving 
to the state regime. 
You know, this is not about me wanting to have more registrants, or 
whatever.  The question is: What is the best solution for this? 
If we just wanted to focus on where most of the money was, like 
hedge funds are very concentrated, advisers are very concentrated.  If 
you decided, “We will only take advisers that have $1 billion or more of 
assets,” we would have very few advisers but we would have almost all 
the assets.  Our job would become much easier, but I am not sure that 
the American public would be better off. 
 
J.W. VERRET: Can I speak to just the federalism issue a little bit, 
because most of my time and expertise is in the Delaware corporate law 
issue and the chartering competition question.  In that respect, I think 
federalism only works, or works best at least, when there is some 
competition and when the regulation relates to the chartering or the state 
competes with other states to get charters, and so regulation internalizes 
cost in that way.  I think that dynamic is probably one we don’t really 
see here, because you regulate the firms located in your state or do 
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business in your state or even get extraterritorial regulation. 
Then if you want to go broader, you get the whole Spitzer issue of 
the attorneys general getting involved as well.  So I think I would 
probably agree that states do not have the benefits they would in the 
corporate context. 
 
PAUL ROTH: I think that this is a legacy of federalism.  I am not 
prepared to argue against federalism. 
What I would prefer, though, because I think that there is something 
in what J.W. is talking about in terms of different regimes providing 
competition and experimentation — my own concern is that the way the 
bills read presently, they are requiring people to register with the states 
unless they meet a certain assets-under-management threshold.  I would 
not necessarily — well, if I could have one, I probably wouldn’t do 
away with state regulation, because I think that there are some people 
who believe very, very strongly that the closer to home the regulator is, 
the better it is. 
But I would like to see people who wish to be regulated by the SEC 
have the choice, rather than have to go through the states, because of the 
way in which the congressional bills appear to be focusing right now.  I 
think, again, there is a huge body of law and a lot of learning on what it 
means to be registered with the SEC, and in some states there is not, and 
if you are in multiple states it can be a problem, whereas if you are 
registered with the SEC, except for antifraud violations, for which any 
state can go after you, they do not have substantive regulation over you. 
So to my way of looking at it, you could keep the federalist 
approach but you should give the person who is registering the 
opportunity to choose which regime they want to go under. 
 
ANDREW DONOHUE: I would point out something that is a 
complicating factor.  We are talking here in the context of private funds 
and the legislative approach of having the advisers register and all that.  
There is another dynamic that is out there in the adviser space which 
does affect the state vs. federal, which is that there still is an open item 
that in my area and in the broker-dealer area we need to address, which 
is referred to as the IABD problem, which comes out of the FPA 
decision, which is the intersection of the broker-dealer community and 
the adviser community as it deals with retail clients.  To the extent that 
one might move more advisers to the states, it may hinder potential 
solutions to that dynamic, which is whether or not broker-dealers and 
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advisers have somewhat of a level playing field or whether we are kind 
of pushing the business one way or the other, and whether or not, 
particularly for retail clients, the remedies that are available to them, the 
duties that are owed to them, may differ significantly. 
So when I think about adviser registration and issues moving 
numbers around, in the back of my mind, or sometimes in the front of 
my mind, is that we also need to solve this other problem, which is 
hugely important for retail investors.  That is part of what I think when 
people say, “Okay, $100 million winds up going all to the states.”  That 
is all retail. 
 
JAMES JALIL: Well, I think we could go on forever, but it’s 12:30 
and I know that we promised we would wrap up. 
I would like to thank the panelists.  They have done a wonderful 
job. 
 
[Applause] 
 
We are having lunch on the 12th floor at Lowenstein. 
 
[Adjournment: 12:34 p.m.] 
 
